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Abstract
A renewed interest in ontology and the ontological station of erstwhile considered humans
and nonhumans has provoked interest in the implications that such station might hold for
the built, metabolized, and governed environment. It is the contention of this work that the
contemporary manifestation of hydro-social assemblages, water distribution networks, reflects and is produced by a totalizing spectacular ideology that relies on such networks being
imbricated in such a manner as to de-emphasize or deny their ontological standing. Perceiving in the Unitary Urbanism articulated by the situationists of the 1960s an anticipation and
critique of such spectacular ideology, and its vested stake in the ontological debasement
of the constitutive elements of the urban ecological whole, the particular and particularly
isolated disciplines which maintain such debasement, namely architecture and politics, are
found wanting in their inability to transcend the separations that such spectacular ideology
entails. It is contended moreover that an understanding of how the contemporary western
urban environment is premised upon an ideologically ossified episteme, of what is or is not
possible to know of the constitution of everyday life, might open up the possibility of different
compositional and aesthetic arrangements more amenable to an ontological respect for the
erstwhile considered humans and nonhumans that comprise such urban environments, and
compositional and aesthetic arrangements that democratically account for the participation
of those erstwhile considered humans and nonhumans as they asymmetrically participate in
a newly conceived of commons.
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Introduction I
(When the Emperor Has No Clothes, Fire the Fashion Critics)

If we see the earth as a spaceship, and go further to invoke the
comparison of a lifeboat, it is of course of vital concern to everybody
in the boat if the crew or the passengers start polluting the supply of
food and water, distributing supplies on a grossly inequitable basis,
knocking holes in the bottom of the boat, or worst of all trying to blow
the boat out from under us.
–

Neoliberalism, at heart, is a political form that emphasizes capital’s purported ability to regulate and manage itself, “maximizing the role of the private sector in determining priorities” as Nato
Thompson writes, “and deemphasizing the role of the public and the state’s function in protecting and
supporting them.”2 However, ideology is not simply a choice but rather inherently a totalisation, and
indeed neoliberal ideology is invested in not only the promotion of a market based system of relations in the global and urban spheres, but is moreover invested in the construction of a kind of neuter
urban commons that would most readily allow for that totalisation. It is this aspect of ideology, the
fundament of what we will call ‘spectacular’ – i.e., that which serves the ‘spectacle’ of global neoliberal capital – that will be addressed here as it inheres within contemporary urban hydro-technical
assemblages and their composition. “It’s not about saving money. It’s about imposing ideology,” as
University of Victoria climatologist Andrew Weaver commented on the closure of the ELA, “what is
happening here is that the government has an ideological agenda to develop the Canadian economy
based on the extraction of oil out of the Alberta tar sands as quickly as possible and sell it as fast as
it can, come hell and high water, and eliminate any barriers that stand in their way.”3 Make no mistake, the policies of the current government are ecologically unsound – as has been pointed out else-

2 Nato Thompson, Living as Form: Socially Engaged Art from 1991 – 2011 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012), 29.
3 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Canada’s PM Stephen Harper faces revolt by scientists” The Guardian, Published July 09 2012, Accessed July 12 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jul/09/canada-stephen-harper-revolt-scientists.
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where – but the conceptual framework from which normative judgements like ‘ecologically unsound’
may be generated is indeed also in question here. The current work is therefore about how this ideological imposition takes place, first through the aesthetic manipulations of the urban environment to
foster ontological commitments in its denizens that are in accord with the smooth façade of neoliberal
ideology itself, and second through the specialization of urban knowledge sets – ‘specialized sciences’ as Lefebvre calls them – which would inhibit compositions of the built environment which do
not accord with these manipulations. That is, this work will ask first how hydro-technical assemblages
are constituted in such a manner as to remain essentially benign, or indeed helpful, to the auspice
of the neoliberal spectacle, and second how even the most basic of conceptual tools like ‘politics’ or
‘architecture’ are actually implicated within and integral to this mollification and making-innocuous of
the ecological whole.
In an open letter to the government upon learning of the closure, John P. Smol, Canada
Research Chair in Environmental Change, along with seven of his colleagues at the ELA, wrote that
“water is essential for life. Clean water is crucial for the health of all Canadians, and lakes are part of
our social, spiritual and economic well-being.”4 And indeed while their interest is first and foremost in
the continuation of the ELA and their research into how to best preserve and upkeep the metabolic
health of Canada’s freshwater corpus, this is no less true for, and is indeed integrally connected with,
the possibility of and capacity for urban water distribution networks, and hence the possibility of the
urban as part of the ecological whole whatsoever. Neoliberal ideology depends on the health of the
ecological whole, too – though, as the closure of the ELA gestures towards, the spectacular edifice of
neoliberalism is incapable of confronting or engaging with the ecological whole in anything other than
a relation of exploitation and domination. Neoliberal ideology is not only antagonistic to institutions
that speak to its unsustainable appropriation of materials from that ecological whole, but is moreover vested in the concrete composition of urban environments in its own spectacular image – and
indeed only in its own spectacular image – a spectacular image that veils this being-unsustainable.
The spectacle of neoliberal ideology on the one hand relies on the health of the ecological commons,
though it is incapable of anything other than the rampant appropriation and exploitation of that ecological commons, and so the spectacle of neoliberal ideology therefore also relies on constructions
and disclosures of ‘the urban’ that veil this tension; constructions and disclosures which allow it to act
on its antagonism towards alternative knowledge sets (like those being generated by the ELA) with a

4 Smol et. al, “Water and Wisdom” Globe & Mail.
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minimum of opposition and push-back, i.e. with a minimum of democratic inclusion or participation.
The ends of the material appropriations of water are flowing beneath our feet and within the
walls but the aesthetic composition of the urban environment is such that their appearance at the
tap can be taken in the abstract, divorced from the social and technological manipulations applied
to those materials in the event of their appropriation, and divorced from the consequences of those
appropriations in the broader ecological whole. The current work concerns, therefore, how such
aesthetic and environmental separations serve ideological ends, how they imply certain epistemic
delimitations and ontological commitments, and how these spectacular separations might be recognized and acted upon. Again, this thesis is about the urban environments which are dependent upon
the health and well-being of the broader ecological whole – rather than about the broader ecological
whole itself – but nonetheless this work is specifically about the aesthetic/ideological edifices of contemporary neoliberal politics which act against institutions like the ELA – institutions whose analyses
and investigations are inconvenient to the kinds of virulent and unsustainable constructions and appropriations that neoliberal ideology would, and indeed does, otherwise employ.
How the urban environment is produced by and represents the ideological spectacle of contemporary neoliberalism allows, and indeed fosters, the sort of ambivalence towards the kind of acts
that reproduce these relations – or rather, fosters a sort of ambivalence towards acts that are themselves ideologically produced to seem benign but are indeed profoundly violent. That is, these acts
ensure the endless parasitic reproduction of their actor – the arbiters of neoliberal ideology and spectacular global capital. They survive upon the ideological veil constructed through these acts, like the
closure of the ELA. For example, how ‘the natural’ is ideologically constructed and codified as hermetically distinct from the urban – the codification being here an ideological gesture or act – allows for a
sort of ambivalence towards the aesthetic absence of materials like water in the urban as they occur
anywhere but at ideologically sanctioned positions like the mouth of the tap. This work is an attempt to
view the visual and aesthetic banishment of water infrastructure from the contemporary cityscape as
profoundly symptomatic of neoliberal ideology and demonstrative of its predilection to the inauguration and maintenance of a series of lazy dualisms which keep some determination of ‘us’ on one side
and ‘nature’ on the other. In other words, the spectacular delimitation of the urban as in opposition to
the spectacular delimitation of nature – and not recognizing the urban as itself, in a more fundamental
respect, ‘natural’ – is characteristic of neoliberal ideology and the spectacle it serves.

4

We should be concerned about analysing and interpreting the aesthetic composition of the
urban – what ideological purposes it may be serving and how it contours the possibility of our knowledge or knowing as such – because it is indeed not simply neutral in its vulgar there-ness, but is
rather more than the partisan construction of merely one ideological field (Rob Ford’s Toronto, the
Harper government, global neoliberal capitalism as such, etc.), it is indeed the ongoing project of
many ideological fields! Both spatially and temporally, an accurate topology of the urban ecological
whole is all the more difficult but at the same time all the more necessary. Water is a useful subject
in this respect because it so viscerally connects the urban to the broader ecological whole (of which
the urban is nevertheless itself a part), and also because it has been so pedantically agitated into
the completed objects of the urban socio-technical assemblages: underground, hidden, tamed, debased, instrumentally ‘for us.’ Neoliberal ideology maintains the spectacular visual absence of water
because it accords with an ontological debasement and de-emphasis of water, which allows it to
continue its abuses of the broader ecological commons, largely premised upon this ‘for us’ – though,
as we will see in chapter three, the ‘us’ in ‘for us’ is itself a distinctly exclusionary set. To this we will
propose alternative ontological commitments, ones which require no ideological veils or exclusions,
and a kind of urbanism commensurable with such ontological inclusiveness.
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Introduction II
(This work is not a political work.)

A critique of the specialized sciences implies a critique of specialized
politics, structures, and their ideologies. Every political group, and
especially every structure, justifies itself through an ideology that it
develops and nurtures: nationalism or patriotism, economism or state
rationalism, philosophism, (conventional) liberal humanism.
–

Henri Lefebvre

“This machine kills fascists” is written on Woody Guthrie’s guitar.
I always enjoyed that “this machine kills fascists” was written on Woody Guthrie’s guitar but there
was inevitably something about it that seemed somehow inimical-to-itself about this phrase – enantiodromic, turning, running back upon itself. The tension is put into relief against the phrase that his
friend Pete Seeger had on his banjo: “this machine surrounds hate and forces it to surrender.”
On the one hand Guthrie’s admirable sentiment, but on the other a corrective – a warning
to not speak the language of the wrong you seek to correct. This work is therefore neither a political nor architectural work: it doesn’t take up the tools of the edifice it seeks to overturn. In seeking
to articulate how the spectacular edifice of neoliberal ideology does not merely molest or distort the
commons, but rather supplants it with a discursive irreality of its own design, we should like to avoid
drawing upon the conceptual resources of that discursive irreality as much as possible. While politics
may very much predate both neoliberal ideology and the function of global capital, it is nevertheless,
today, entirely amenable to them in its contemporary delimitation to a hermetic set of ‘political’ gestures. As the Editors of the Situationist International – whose conceptual framework will figure prominently herein – write:
[It is] necessary to leave the terrain of specialized revolutionary activity
-- the terrain of the self-mystification of “serious politics” -- because it
has long been seen that such specialization encourages even the best
people to demonstrate stupidity regarding all other questions; with the
result that they end up failing even in their merely political struggles,
since the latter are inseparable from all other aspects of the overall
problem of our society.5

5 “The Bad Days Will End” Internationale Situationiste, No. 7, 1962.
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Admittedly, the etymological roots of ‘politics’ do not accord with how politics has been ideologically striated and structured, and one could say that politics does not necessarily refer to the specialized set of ‘political’ gestures in the composition of the commons but rather the entire gamut of
possibilities that stem from the foundation of a Polis, from which the city itself also springs. As Heidegger writes, “the polis is the historical place, the there in which, out of which and for which history
happens.”6 But politics, when it engages and brings into relief all the interconnections and imbrications of everyday life, is nonetheless never merely political. And indeed a politics which exceeds that
which is merely political – by bringing together not only all that which belongs to the polis, but moreover all their possible permutations together – ought not to be conceived of as politics at all. Rather
than subsuming them in saying that these things ‘belong’ to the polis, we should instead say that they
are ‘of’ the polis, but no less than the polis is of them.
This work is, therefore, not a political work. Rancière and Žižek’s endeavours are those of
rescuing the term ‘politics’ from its ossified and, in their terms, apolitical form – that is, the dominant
and reactionary thing that is indeed called ‘politics’ but actually serves only to foreclose the possibility of an actual politics and an actual political act. This is not how we will treat politics. We will
neither treat ‘politics’ as the dark precursor of the kind of End of History that Fukuyama describes,
avoiding the fatalistic resonances that such a conception would imply, nor will we treat ‘politics’ as
the corrective to this, as Rancière and Žižek do. It is neither the endeavour of the current work to effect a similar rescue operation, nor would one even be desirable. It is the aim of the current work to
show how politics, when it is really ‘being-political’ in the way that Rancière and Žižek would want to
understand it, is no longer merely political at all, but is then something else entirely: a holistic constitutive act, or a holistic set of constitutive acts, of a kind that would engage many registers, amongst
which ‘politics’ would be, by necessity, merely one. In order to address how water is ideologically
suppressed, epistemically absent and ontologically unaccounted for, then, this work will therefore
– and indeed must – address the spectacular disciplinarity that has been deployed towards these
ends; that is, to the ends of the reduction of life with water to its most debased and banal forms.
Water as it features within the city cannot be exhausted by what Lefebvre calls ‘the specialized sciences,’ – it can be engaged by them, certainly, but one will inevitably bump up against the predilec-

6 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics Tr. Ralph Manheim (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 128.
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tion of spectacular disciplinarity to subsume all other disciplines ‘below’ any particular discipline that
one may be working with. This work will therefore attempt to take up a kind of meta-discourse of
water insofar as water is itself at once ‘political’ and at the same time drastically apolitical, revealing
the discursive limits of politics as it reveals the discursive limits of all the other ‘specialized sciences’
when read in abstraction from one another.
So on the one hand, this project will then be understood to be a Political Ecology of urban
water infrastructure – but a Political Ecology that is, again, not merely political, but rather a Political Ecology of a kind advocated by Bruno Latour, wherein the words ‘ecology’ and ‘politics’ are not
simply juxtaposed “without a thoroughgoing rethinking of either term.”7 Rather, in understanding how
water is at once structured by and in turn contributes to the structures of politics and architecture,
we should look instead to how compositional gestures and the ecology of the urban commons mutually co-determine; how they either allow for or inhibit our engagement with water in everyday life. In
“excavating the flows that constitute the urban,”8 as Maria Kaika writes, we should like to produce a
Political Ecology focused on how water features in the urban milieu, but that nevertheless has two
broader aims: first, a radical critique of the structural dualisms of man/nature, subject/object, and
inside/outside; and second, a positive project aimed towards the thoroughgoing amelioration and
evacuation of these dualisms and an instantiation of water into a reconceptualised and alternately
configured assembly of a kind which entertains not merely the political register but the political, the
architectural, the ethical, the linguistic, the poetic, the revolutionary, amongst all others. In other
words it is to be contended that we ought not only to seek to liberate water from these philosophically
illegitimate dualisms, but to moreover extrapolate how we might work ‘with’ water to better the cities
that we both inhabit. Though equally well, on the other hand, twinned with this Political Ecology, this
project will also be understood to be a Unitary Urbanism of water infrastructure.
What ‘Unitary Urbanism’ is meant to evoke will be taken up in detail later, and its role in the
dissolution of the kind of disciplinarity that is revealed in the excise of Political Ecology lauded. Suffice it to say for now, though, that a great deal of cerebral effort has been poured into the endeavour
to think through the composition of the commons ontologically as of late – mainly in the last ten years
– amongst a dizzying array of new materialists, object oriented ontologists, speculative realists and

7 Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy Tr. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2004), 2.
8 Maria Kaika, City of Flows: Modernity, Nature, and the City (New York: Routledge, 2005), 25.
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the like, but that relatively little effort has been spared to think through how this composition bears
upon the edifices of everyday life, especially in the built environment. This is rather to ask the question of an ontological kind of urbanism, or an urbanism premised upon a considered ontological position of a materialist or realist kind, that is: can we have cities and hydro-technical assemblages which
are premised upon an ontological care and solicitude towards other members of a newly conceived
commons – ourselves, for whatever we are, along with materials like water and the assemblages that
they entail – and moreover what might these sorts of cities look like? What I would like to suggest
here is that such cities have indeed already been proposed by the situationists of the 1960s, if admittedly not in these specific terms, and we need merely read into their articulation of Unitary Urbanism
an ontological component, which it nonetheless indeed already implies.
The play between the Political Ecology of urban water infrastructure (articulating the topology
of the hydro-social urban whole and where it results in spectacular disjuncts) and an ontologically
premised Unitary Urbanism of water and the networks and assemblages that water is enmeshed in
(demanding the overturn of the systems – the ‘politics’ or ‘architectures’ that entail such spectacular
disjuncts) will comprise the basis of the current work. Chapter one will articulate the relevance of
recently emerged discourses of ontology, most especially ‘Speculative Materialism,’ to the project of
Unitary Urbanism, and the relevance of a Unitary Urbanism to the compositional implications of an
ontological materialism. It is argued that they complement one another in that a Unitary Urbanism is
given licence by a materialist ontology to account for all the actors and assemblages that comprise
the city that are otherwise unaccounted for, and a materialist ontology is given licence by a holistic
compositional project like Unitary Urbanism to realize such recognition in building arrangements of
the city that are proper to it. Chapter two specifically interrogates architecture as the sedimentary
form of a spectacular disciplinarity that otherwise produces its own conditions and further reproduction – the ideological debasement and aesthetic banishment of materials like water being part and
parcel thereof. Finally, chapter three specifically interrogates neoliberalism as the specific exclusionary political form that such reproduction – the reinscription of the spectacle – not only instantiates but
relies upon in kind.
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Chapter One
Water in the Metropolis: Speculative Materialism and the Spectacle
The self isn’t a unity and the world isn’t a unity, and so Kant had
the wrong problem. The problem shouldn’t be to show that the
unity of the world is correlative with the unity of the self, but to
show that the disunity of the world is correlative with the disunity
of the self.
– William James

Water dives from the clouds without parachute, wings or safety
net. Water runs over the steepest precipice and blinks not a lash.
Water is buried and rises again; water walks on fire and fire gets
blisters. Stylishly composed in any situation – solid, gas or liquid
– speaking in penetrating dialects understood by all things – animal, vegetable or mineral – water travels intrepidly through four
dimensions, sustaining (Kick a lettuce in the field and it will yell
‘Water!’), destroying (The Dutch boy’s finger remembered the
view from Ararat) and creating (It has even been said that human beings were invented by water as a device for transporting
itself from one place to another, but that’s another story). Always
in motion, ever-flowing (whether at steam rate or glacier speed),
rhythmic, dynamic, ubiquitous, changing and working its changes, a mathematics turned wrong side out, a philosophy in reverse.
..
– Tom Robbins

In what follows, the material substance of water and its place within the contemporary North American and European metropolis will be of central concern. It is to be contended that we, the denizens
of Western cities, have a flawed political and architectural relation to water. We have tolerated,
implicitly, an egregious lack of potable water for those in the global south, and done so through a tacit
– and lazy – indifference. We have tolerated the ecological damage wrought by the concrete edifices of these politics and architectures in the form of what Sloterdijk has called an ‘enlightened false
consciousness,’ wherein the reality of a situation is inescapable but we nevertheless acquiesce to
ideological forms that posit the reality as fundamentally not-there. This has occurred because of the
urban environment that we live in and how it is ideologically managed and segmented into a series of
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benign disciplines of ‘the urban’ that neither speak to one another nor compose the urban commons
together. If we are to understand how wanton indifference obtains in relation to the broader global
commons and the unseen commons of the urban ecological whole we must understand it as stemming from the auspices of the sectioned and compartmentalized urban form.
It is not simply that our politics or architectures are in-and-of-themselves flawed; it is not that
we simply practice the wrong politics, or the wrong architecture, and that there is a right politics and
a right architecture to deploy. No, what is to be contended here is that these indifferences and enlightened false consciousnesses towards how water is figured as a material in and out of the city are
the result of our relations to water being indeed variously political or architectural, and in their not
having been conceived of or practiced together – in and amongst other modes of relation – in the
composition of a unified urban environment. There is no right politics, no right architecture, because
they can only fulfil their promise when they are overturned by a relation that operates on each of
their registers, as well as all others, at once. This implies a radical change to the standing of what is
possible and what is real.
It is therefore also to be contended here that this flawed political and architectural relation
– our relating to water merely politically, or merely architecturally – is integrally and inextricably tied
to, and caused by, a more basic and fundamentally flawed epistemological and ideological relation
to water. Indeed this flawed epistemological and ideological relation to water is, moreover, premised
upon a flawed ontological relation to water – water having been ideologically produced and presented as ‘for us’ rather than ‘in itself.’ This mode of relation has seen the political and aesthetic exclusion
of not only water itself but equally well all those other assemblages that depend on water. It has seen
such exclusion in its privileging the otherwise ‘human’ assemblages of extant urban ecological commons – that is to say, the commons as it exists today – at the expense of its other, often unrecognized, often ‘non-human,’ members. To be sure, it has also seen the political and aesthetic exclusion
of certain erstwhile considered ‘human’ assemblages in virtue of its being premised upon a logic of
inclusion and exclusion, inside and outside, that has often times seen those who would otherwise be
considered ‘humans’ figured as ‘less than human.’
These arrangements of a merely political politics and a merely architectural architecture are
therefore neither acceptable within a commons that recognizes the ontological autonomy of nonhu-
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man members, and networks of erstwhile considered humans and nonhuman actors, nor do these
arrangements actually fulfil their promise of the continued well-being of the erstwhile considered
human actors that these arrangements do purport to account for (most notably as the constitutive
subject of neoliberal ideology). This work will therefore articulate a unified program of reorientation or
alternative comportment towards water, as indeed towards materials generally as they engage with
the urban ecological whole, in both a mutually co-determinate Political Ecology of urban water assemblages and a Unitary Urbanism in which water, by necessity, must figure prominently. In understanding how water has been ideologically de-emphasized and understanding the kind of city that
results from this de-emphasis, it is to be hoped we might foster a more robust and articulated practice of the urban, a more engaged and sustainable environmental ethic, and a more liberatory and
emancipatory metropolitan aesthetic.
It is the intent of this work to articulate, first, how our merely political and merely architectural
relation to water in the contemporary metropolis gives rise to the contemporary epistemological comportment towards water as that which has been ideologically instituted as the discursive limit of what
is possible to know or to do. Then, we should like to look to how that ideological apparatus fosters
and gives rise to contemporary metropolitan politics and architecture, and importantly how this cyclical relation might come to be otherwise; how we might relate to water differently, and, in so doing,
free ourselves towards a city with a mode of relation that entails the work of each individual discipline
but conceived of together as the holistic work of building the urban commons. That is, through the
bringing together of contemporary ontological philosophy and the radical politics of the situationsts,
we would like to articulate a set of holistic compositional gestures which entail both a politics and an
architecture commensurable with a revolution in citizenry, where contributions are not simply made
by persons and delineable sets of people, but also actors and delineable sets of networks. The qualities and characteristics of water lend themselves to articulation in the terms of this kind of assemblage and network analysis; its propensity to flow, to mix, to solve and to cycle demonstrate precisely
the discursive and rhizomatic essence of assemblages and networks as such. “Networks of human
and non-human actors emerge around water use that have a sense of order, enabling actors to take
further action, further ordering the networks and their environment in the process,” as Pieter van der
Zaag, Alex Bolding and Emmanuel Manzungu write, and “since the material things are intricately
interwoven in these networks, the actors using the water may find it difficult to adapt their action to
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the new institutional reality, unless they re-adjust the entire assembly of the network, including its
material parts.”9 Indeed they function by, as Erik Swyngedouw writes, “assembling human and nonhuman actors in a more or less coherent but heterogeneous network that sustains the socioenvironmental transformation process.”10 That is, while hydro-technical networks and assemblages develop
and function as ostensibly unrecognized, the distribution of and infrastructure surrounding water
continue to inform the parameters of the city available to the ideological intentions of the state (and
more generally what we will later call spectacular global capital), but only as the invisible limitations
of a system which has as its aim the ostensible nullification of limits whatsoever, i.e. the affirmation of
its own intransience as it features within specific arrangements and ubiquity as a consistent feature
of the urban ecological whole. In other words, while the city depends on water, ideology depends on
the city being understood to be not entirely dependent upon anything. We would like to lay out some
of the reasons that water and its hydro-technical assemblages ought to be democratically included in
the figurations of the urban commons, and some of the reasons why this is nevertheless not the case
today.

Anthropocentric Exceptionalism and Speculative Thought: Ethical Consideration
With that in mind, then, it is important to articulate why the inclusion of nonhuman ‘actants’ – as Bruno Latour calls them – like water and its concomitant assemblages, is important for the composition
and function of what we would otherwise call politics, the development of architectural aesthetics,
and the redress of environmental concerns. It is, however, not at all the case that we must choose
between strictly anthropocentric concerns and the concerns of an otherwise indifferent cosmological
whole, as is contended by some (cf. Brassier), but rather it is the case that just as we can show philosophical care and solicitude to ‘the other’ of the social sciences, we can equally well work in productive collaboration with delineable actors, networks, and assemblages. Indeed the concerns of these
composite actors and networks, more often than not, are not so far from the terrain of the specifically
‘human’ concerns of the specific erstwhile considered ‘humans’ who often times make up parts of

9 Pieter van der Zaag, Alex Bolding and Emmanuel Manzungu “Water-networks and the actor: the case of the Save River

catchment, Zimbabwe” in Resonances and Dissonances in Development: Actors, Networks and Cultural Reportoires Ed.
Paulus Gerardus, Maria Hebinck and Gerard Verschoor (Denmark: Koninklijke, 2001), 257; 274.
10 Erik Swyngedouw “Producing Nature, Scaling Environment: Water, Networks, and Territories in Fascist Spain” in Leviathan Undone? Towards a Political Economy of Scale Ed. Roger Keil and Rianne Mahon (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2009), 122.
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those delineable assemblages and networks. Even when our concerns and interests do diverge,
it is ethical by and within the terms of our extant democratic ethics to maintain and engage in relations fairly and earnestly, as though between any two social assemblages whose interests diverge.
Though, moreover, it is within our interests to engage with such differences, even and especially, if
our extant ethical frameworks are overturned or radically altered. That is, a fully articulated commons
capable of mediating such divergence ought to have a similarly articulated ethical component, though
not one which relies upon the lazy humanism of neoliberal ideology. Indeed, rather than simply falling
back upon a convenient ontological privilege with which we might brush those offending concerns of
other delineable actors and networks aside – if only because the radically democratic composition of
such a commons would be less amenable and available to the codified exclusion of those who may
have been, or may yet become members of such a commons. As Latour writes:
This way of looking at things does not entail an anthropomorphism that
would take us back to the premodern past – a past that is only exoticism on the part of the moderns, of course – but rather the end of a
ruinous anthropomorphism through which objects, indifferent to the fate
of humans, were in the habit of intervening from the outside and acting
without due process to sweep away the work of political assemblies. .
. indeed, appearances notwithstanding, the famous ‘indifference of the
cosmos to human passions’ offers the oddest of anthropocentrisms,
since it claims to give form to humans, while silencing them through the
incontestable power of objectivity devoid of all passion! The nonhumans
had been kidnapped and turned into stones that could be thrown at the
assembled demos.”11
Indeed it is precisely because an objectifying delimitation of ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’ is axiomatic
to our ‘politics’ and our ‘architectures’ that they are not conceived of together and with other modes
of composition – mythopoetic, musical, sociological, environmental, and the like. Our tacit acceptance of ontological privilege has reduced us a merely one kind of commons, the kind alleged to be
good ‘for us,’ available to humanist delimitation and specialized purview, even if the ‘us’ in ‘for us’
has historically been a fairly rarified set (subjects proper to the global auspices of neoliberalism, as
is discussed in chapter three). With a critique of a merely anthropocentric demos thus in place – the
case for “including nonhumans in the demos”12 having been made – the means and methods of such
inclusion will then be laid out in the articulation of the philosophical relevance of ‘object oriented
ontologies,’ for the purposes of, as Reza Negarestani writes, “understanding some of the disjunctive

11 Latour, Politics of Nature, 54.
12 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 30.
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impasses between speculative thought and politics as well as possibilities for mobilizing a politics
capable of using the resources of speculative thought.”13 To be sure, it is not so much that we should
like to draw out some of the disjunctive impasses between speculative thought and ‘politics;’ given
how we are treating ‘politics’ these are indeed implicit and implied. Rather we should like to draw
out how speculative thought is inherent to a unified practice of the city – that you cannot have one
without the other – and that this unified practice, taking its licence from a speculative thought which
considers the ontological autonomy of others within a newly conceived commons, is useful for understanding: first, why water has been figured as it has in the contemporary city, as absent; second,
why we ought to see this as a problem, because it serves the interests of neoliberal ideology and not
necessarily its subjects; and third, how it may be otherwise, through the holistic evacuation of specialized disciplinary approaches to the urban.

Anthropocentric Exceptionalism and Speculative Thought: Democratic Inclusion
So, why is it important that materiality play a role in the composition of the demos? Why must we
tear down the ontological throne that that we have built for ourselves at the head of the cosmological whole? The critique of anthropocentrism and humanism have been a major theme in social and
political thought over the past half-century. The ontological privileging of human – or some iteration
of who gets to be called ‘human’ and who doesn’t – has had tragic and nightmarish consequences,
to be sure, not the least of which seems to be the acknowledgement – in the humanities at least – of
the perilously untenable nature of the philosophical position of the coherent and autonomous ‘subject.’ With respect to its otherwise exclusionary inauguration, the demos – having been originally a
catchall meaning, as Rancière notes, “to be outside of the count, to have no speech to be heard”14 –
has transformed itself admirably from the excluded exterior of the Arche of Agamemnon to the inclusive interior of another Arche of its own design. But democracy is only authentic to its roots when it
is indeed inclusive, when it makes a place for the placeless and counts the uncounted. Faith in the
coherence and autonomy of the human subject, its ontological privilege – its otherwise theologically
derived ecstasis from the world – has prevented us for too long from having a democracy constituted

13 Reza Negarestani, “Drafting the Inhuman: Conjectures on Capitalism and Organic Necrocracy” in The Speculative
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14 Jacques Rancière, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics Tr. Steve Corcoran (London: Continuum, 2010), 32.
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not by the negative precursors of those who cannot take part but rather by the very figuration of its
own origin, the inclusion of those who were fundamentally and essentially excluded, or more specifically included and figured as excluded and figureless. As Latour writes:
Let there be no misunderstanding: Political Ecology is not going to be
simpler, nicer, more rustic, more bubolic, than the old bicameral politics. It will be both simpler and more complicated: simpler because it
will no longer live under the constant threat of a double short circuit, by
Science and by force, but also much more complicated, for the same
reason – for want of short circuits, it is going to have to start all over and
compose the common world bit by bit.15
It is no longer the case that we can rely on the mere self-evidence of our status as primary and in
some sense ‘above’ the cosmological whole, as it is nonetheless composed, for the composition of
a collective that is capable of addressing the problems of the day (many of which have been brought
on by the very anthropocene that has given rise to that uncritical self-evidence). Indeed, as the editors of The Speculative Turn volume write:
The danger is that the dominant anti-realist strain of continental philosophy has not only reached a point of decreasing returns, but that it now
actively limits the capacities of philosophy in our time. . . in the face of
the ecological crisis, the forward march of neuroscience, the increasingly splintered interpretations of basic physics, and the ongoing breach
of the divides between human and machine, there is a growing sense
that previous philosophies are incapable of confronting these events.16
And we would easily and without reservation add the specific crisis of the worldwide availability of
potable drinking water as well as the strain placed upon water resources by, for example, the procedure known as ‘fracking’ – the chemical and hydraulic fracturing of rock layers for the purposes of
harvesting natural gas (a procedure whose detriment to the water-table is not yet entirely understood,
though could be potentially devastating). It is not so much the specific hydro-technical practices of
neoliberalism and their ecological consequences that we are considering here, however, but rather
that the condition of our tolerance for these practices and their consequences is actually built into the
constructed environment of the city and its political forms. That is, spectacular ideology acts with both
hands, plundering with the one, and with the other composing an environment in which their plundering is either unseen, or not seen as such. As Lefebvre writes, “the urban is veiled; it flees thought,

15 Latour, Politics of Nature, 82 – 83.
16 Bryant, Srnicek, and Harman, The Speculative Turn, 3.
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which blinds itself, and becomes fixated only on a clarity that is in retreat from the actual.”17 Whether
you are indeed for or against the specific manipulations and deployments of water by neoliberal
ideology is beside the point; the point is rather that the city is composed in such a way as to deny
the possibility of its interment of water truly being considered. What is water in the city outside of the
epistemic veil of spectacular disciplinarity? We do not yet know.

Liquid Materiality: “Nature” and “Human” in Flux
Materiality has, without a doubt, been of central concern to political and architectural thinking, and
indeed has been of central concern with a more or less explicit reference to their ideological and
epistemological foundations, at least since the time of Marx. The appropriation and reconfiguration of
material is, and is in no uncertain terms, the basis of the sets of relations upon which history unfolds
for those of a Marxist orientation, at least in the sense of the historical materialism that Marx outlines. And yet, as Jane Bennett points out in her book Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things,
“this materiality most often refers to human social structures or to the human meanings ‘embodied’
in them and other objects.”18 Or rather, it is still not the material itself which is being addressed in a
particular composition of the commons, but rather still our ideologically contoured and mediated relation towards the material, our privileged ontological station as it pertains to a still otherwise inert and
infinitely malleable ‘nature.’ It is this concept of an unstructured and undifferentiated ‘nature,’ demonstrably both structured and differentiated, which must be scrutinized, for as Bruno Latour asserts,
“the terms ‘nature’ and ‘society’ do not designate domains of reality; instead, they refer to a quite specific form of public organization.”19 Material exceeds our relation to it, and in so doing returns to us in
unexpected ways, we have no unified account for the autonomy of matter, i.e. what the water ‘does’
once it leaves us.
For example, we certainly have an account of how we bring it under the nomos of the polis,
appropriate it, and eventually expropriate it back into the wild, but we have very little figuration – especially within politics – of its being otherwise. That is, we have little holistic appreciation for its being
outside of our relation towards it – or at least that is what our contemporary urban forms would seem

17 Henri Lefebvre, The Urban Revolution Tr. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 41.
18 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, xvi.
19 Latour, Politics of Nature, 53.
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to imply – and, as such, the erstwhile understanding of materiality, and the contours and figurations
of how material features within the structures and systems of exclusively our design, is critically and
unforgivably insufficient (insofar as we ought not only consider water when it is immanent or integral to the urban, though this is exclusively how neoliberal ideology considers water). We have no
program for making the specialized disciplines of the urban account for the autonomy of water; nor
should we want a merely political account that has appropriated architecture; nor a linguistic account
that has appropriated politics; nor any other permutation of one ideologically constituted discipline
consuming another. As Lefebvre writes:
“The urban phenomenon, as a global reality, is in urgent need of people
who can pool fragmentary bits of knowledge, the achievement of such
a goal is difficult or impossible. Specialists can only comprehend such
a synthesis from the point of view of their own field, using their data,
their terminology, their concepts and assumptions. They are dogmatic
without realizing it, and the more competent they are, the more dogmatic. This gives rise periodically to a kind of scientific imperialism in
fields such as economy, history, sociology, demography, and so on.
Every scholar feels other ‘disciplines’ are his auxiliaries, his vassals or
servants. He oscillates between scientific hermeticism and confusion –
academic Babel. . . How can we make the transition from fragmentary
knowledge to complete understanding? How can we define this need
for totality?”20
Rather we ought to work towards an account of water as a member of a holistically conceived commons, of which politics will by definition be a part. As Latour writes:
As human politics notices that it no longer has any reserve or dumping
ground, what we begin to see clearly is not that we must at last concern ourselves seriously with nature as such, but, on the contrary, that
we can no longer leave the entire set of nonhumans captive under the
exclusive auspices of nature as such.21
This artifice is specifically perceptible to us only in the analysis of the modes of their ideological
construction as originary and self-evident, or rather in the very production of their being-originary and
their being-self-evident. As Kaika writes:
“Barring the flow of water between the natural, the urban, and the domestic sphere reveals that nature and the city are not separate entities
or autonomous ‘space envelopes,’ but hybrids, neither purely humanmade nor purely natural; outcomes of the same socio-spatial process of
the urbanization of nature. . . water itself is also recounted as a hybrid.
As it flows from spaces of production to spaces of consumption, it

20 Lefebvre, The Urban Revolution, 54; 56.
21 Latour, Politics of Nature, 58.
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undergoes changes in its physical, socio-political and cultural character. When it reaches our faucet in the form of potable water it is neither
purely natural nor purely a human construction.”22
We too, after all, are hybrids, and therefore never merely human, comprised of the very same material that we so section off and call ‘nature’ blithely, as though it has nothing to do with us: in addition
to our bodies being composed of water to the tune of 60 to 80 per cent, as is widely understood,
there are other more disquieting contributions that should be taken into consideration. “My ‘own’
body is material, and yet this vital materiality is not fully or exclusively human,” as Bennett writes,
quoting biologist Nicholas Wade, “the crook of my elbow, for example, is ‘a special ecosystem, a
bountiful home to no fewer than six tribes of bacteria. . . . They are helping to moisturize the skin by
processing the raw fats it produces. . . .The bacteria in the human microbiome collectively possess
at least 100 times as many genes as the mere 20,000 or so in the human genome.’”23 We ought not
subscribe to a ‘humanist’ delimitation of politics and architecture as hermetic and isolated disciplines,
then, because it excludes those nonhuman members and assemblages who have a rightful stake
in the composition of the collective commons, because it has historically, and even now, excluded
members who are human but have been ideologically figured as ‘less than human,’ and because the
determination of ‘human’ itself is spurious and untenable.
It is critical, then, that we attempt to not simply ‘track’ the autonomous materiality of water in
terms of a purely positivistic scientific genealogy or archaeology of movement, but to recognize our
implication within those movements, those flows – to recognize not only the extent to which we are
comprised by water but to moreover recognize the extent to which water, and its concomitant assemblages, structure the composition of everyday life within the context of the Western cityscape.
This is not to say, however, that we ought to collapse all difference or delineation, that we ought to
recreate the intractable indifference of two philosophically illegitimate constructions, man and nature,
into one – but instead this is simply to try to “horizontalize the relations between humans, biota, and
abiota” as Bennett writes, to move strategically and scrupulously “away from an ontologically ranked
Great Chain of Being and towards a greater appreciation of the complex entanglements of [erstwhile
considered] humans and nonhumans.”24 The manifold assemblages and delineable/appreciable actors that swarm around water, even when only restricted to how it factors in the contemporary me-

22 Maria Kaika, City of Flows, 5 – 6.
23 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 112.
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tropolis, would all benefit from a more robust inclusion within the processes and procedures that form
and structure their environment – as it is indeed their environment too – though such inclusion is only
possible under conditions of a radical reconfiguration of those very processes and procedures. Indeed we would all benefit from a more interrogative and self-critical understanding of our constitutive
involvement in and around these assemblages.

Spectacular Ideology and Alternative Ontologies
The spectacular city is itself constituted as a technology of separation that inhibits the possibility of
erstwhile considered humans and nonhumans recognizing each other as ontologically ‘there’ equally
– be they present to or absent from one another – and leaves us with the unsatisfying condition of
either encountering materials like water as merely ‘for us,’ or not encountering them at all. “Give up
the futile attempt to disentangle the human from the nonhuman,” as Bennett encourages polemically,
“seek instead to engage more civilly, strategically, and subtly with the nonhumans in the assemblages in which you, too, participate.”25 In order to have water contribute as a non-human actor itself
within the newly reconstructed demos, then, we should seek to disentangle ourselves not from an
abstraction or idealist notion of nature, but rather from our own adherence to or respect for these artificial abstractions and idealist systematizations – from our own ideologically informed epistemes of
what is and is not possible to know and to do. Rather than any feature or quality of water and its assemblages being inherently irreconcilable to the possibility of a kind of holistic commons and its being included in the demos – the collective that determines the organization and production of everyday life – its erstwhile exclusion is instead due to our own lazy allegiance to the easy dualisms that
inevitably spring from an anthropocentric episteme and its ideological production and maintainance,
and the aesthetic composition of an urban environment that is commensurable with such dualisms.
Indeed this is why, as Debord wrote, “the crisis of urbanism is all the more concretely a
social and political one, even though today no force born of traditional politics is any longer capable
of dealing with it.”26 That is, the concrete and reified edifices of an ideological privileging of ‘the
human’ represent not only a politics which is insufficient in its being merely political, but moreover
an ecological whole which is today so problematic precisely because its contemporary expression

25 Ibid, 116.
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is proper to that merely political politics. The contemporary expression of these spectacular forms
is the environment which develops and has developed as a result, and therefore seems so normatively intransient because its hermetic isolations (apartment, building, block, neighbourhood) accord
with the hermetic isolations of the disciplines responsible for its production (politics, architecture, art,
etc.); as opposed to the contiguous whole that would develop under the auspices of the commons
which conceives of these disciplines together – obviates them in a holistic conception of how the
urban ecological whole might otherwise be.
What is required in order to effectively work against and stave off the proliferation of illegitimate anthropocentrism in our ideological comportment towards water and its political and architectural instantiation and incarnation – their being manifest in the ‘meat’ of the city – is to connect an
ontological project, one which accounts and allows for the interests of each discernable member
of the cosmological whole, to an alternate ideological project, one which in its inception already
has a kernel of this cosmological whole grounding the ethico-political priorities that it seeks to
make manifest. “This means emphasizing practices that do not contradict one another,” as Isabelle
Stengers writes, emphasizing practices which “have diverging ways of having things and situations
matter,” which, instead of contradicting one another, “produce their own lines of divergence as they
produce themselves.”27 In other words, insofar as our Political Ecology of water infrastructure is
premised upon such a conception of ontology, the relevant ideological project is then, as McKenzie Wark writes, “a social or political agenda only to the extent that objects are social and political
in and of themselves.”28 The city must be approached not as an ossified relic of a one time lapse
in ontological respect for the social and political nature of objects, but an ongoing feedback loop
wherein the specific constitution of the city, its architecture and politics, is at once premised upon
and prefigures its own epistemological and ideological comportment, and the specific constitution
of what is understood to be possible or impossible, at any one point, is both premised upon and
prefigures the forms and figurations that the city will become. The banalization of material – its being ontologically emptied-out by the ideological apparatus – is incarnated in the politics of architecture of the city and serves in turn to produce and proliferate the ontological banalization of material
at the level of ideology and epistemology.

27 Isabelle Stengers, “Wondering about Materialism” in The Speculative Turn, 378.
28 McKenzie Wark “(P)OO Praxis (Object Oriented)” as presented at OOOIII The Third Object Oriented Ontology Symposium, The
New School, September 14th 2011.
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Philosophical Kinships of the Subterranean Urban
As has been said, the two modes of approach here are a Political Ecology and a Unitary Urbanism.
A Political Ecology that is not merely political, to discern the topology of water’s treatment in the city
having been sectioned up into ideologically benign ‘specialized sciences,’ and a Unitary Urbanism
that aims at the overturn of these ideologically constituted disjuncts. The former is used to distinguish
an ideology which requires epistemic acquiesce from that episteme, and the latter tries to distinguish
the commitments of that ideologically constituted episteme from the alternative ontological comportments it veils. As Lefebvre writes, “ideology and knowledge blend together, and we must continuously strive to distinguish them.”29 So in order to articulate how one register of flawed relations gives
lease to the others, two bodies of thought will be called upon and deployed herein: first, the contemporary philosophical movement commonly called ‘speculative materialism,’ insofar as it speaks to the
ways that materials such as water have come to be regarded as mere correlate to anthropic concerns, and hence banalized, robbed of their otherwise autonomous ontological standing. And second,
the urbanism and politics of Guy Debord and the Situationist International, insofar as they presciently
articulated a critique of the ways in which this banalization would be codified not only in the consumer-image that they would come to call ‘the spectacle,’ but more precisely how it would come to be
instantiated and concretized in the very architectural and political forms that constitute everyday life.
To be sure, the situationist critique can also speak to the way that the architectural and political forms – which reproduce themselves endlessly as the substantive material engine of ‘the spectacle’ – denigrate life, deemphasize autonomy, and create the conditions under which the banalization
of ‘the object,’ which the speculative materialists are so very concerned about, has occurred and continues to occur. And indeed the speculative materialist critique of the ontological privileging of the human and of human concerns illuminates the desecration of everyday life by an otherwise functionalist
architecture that the situationists so vehemently abhor (indeed we ought to understand the implicit
humanism in the Functionalist par excellence, Le Corbusier, he did after all ontologically privilege
the human in his having invented his own anthropic system of architectural measurement, based off
the ‘ideal’ form of the human body – “idiosyncratically identified by Le Corbusier as a six-foot English policeman”30). Speculative Materialism and Unitary Urbanism complement one another, both in
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means and ultimately in ends. The situationists advocate for a mode of urbanism that accounts for all
its constituent actors and assemblages and all the ways that they might relate to each other in novel
and productive ways, and the speculative materialists advocate for a recognition of all those constituent actors and assemblages that would necessitate such a mode of urbanism.
In order that these two frameworks are sufficiently deployed, then, water – having been
striated, abstracted, and indeed visually excluded from our direct consciousness in the politics and
architecture of the contemporary city – must not only be avowed again, seen and appreciated in the
aesthetic sense, but must contribute to such a commons as a constitutive actor and part of constitutive assemblages with manifold actors and concerns. From hydroelectric penstock operators to the
breeding grounds of city vermin; from the bathroom taps in the downtown nightclub to the authors of
municipal bylaws tasked with regulating sprinkler usage; from the downstream estuaries to the highrise construction crew – how water is treated politically and architecturally bears directly on each of
these, and to the extent that there is a more or less codified place for water and its concomitant assemblages of humans and nonhumans in the otherwise architectural and political makeup of the city
we can say that such a city is more or less able to deal with and address their concerns. As Latour
writes:
We shall say of a collective that it is more or less articulated, in every
sense of the word: that it ‘speaks’ more, that it is subtler and more
astute, that it includes more articles, greater degrees of freedom, that
it deploys longer lists of actions. We shall say, in contrast, that another
collective is more silent, that it has fewer concerned parties, fewer
degrees of freedom, and fewer independent articles, that it is more
rigid. We can even say of a two-house collective, made up of free subjects and indisputable natures, that it is completely inarticulate, totally
speechless, since the goal of the subject-object opposition is actually to
suppress speech, to suspend debate, to interrupt discussion, to hamper
articulation and composition, to short-circuit public life, to replace the
progressive composition of the common world with the striking transfer
of the indisputable – facts or violence, right or might.31
That said, such a commons is only possible once the separation inherent to the isolated disciplines –
like a merely political politics or a merely architectural architecture – is evacuated. It is the separation
inherent to such hermetic compartmentalizations that reproduces itself into the alienated composition
of everyday life. To be sure, the ideological and epistemic critique the situationists levy against late
capitalism, as manifest by the spectacle, is such that “at its heart we find the expression of a dynamic

31 Latour, Politics of Nature, 86.

23

– conveyed within and though our built environment – of alienation, not only internal to the self, but of
self from other.”32 And indeed the situationist critique of an ideologically instantiated alienation, of the
propensity of the spectacle to reproduce the ultimate interiority of the subject/object dualism in both
the composition of the commons and the built environment, lends itself towards the philosophical
project of speculative materialism, carrying with it that kernel of respect for the cosmological whole.
As Tom McDonough writes, for the situationists “the aim of revolution would then lie not only in the
abolition of class society (the social basis of this alienation) but in the construction of a world in which
the reciprocal recognition of subjects would replace their mutual misrecognition; the end of commodity relations would also be the end of the other apprehended as an object, as a thing in a world of
things.”33 It is hard to understate how vital this is to the philosophical kinship between speculative materialism and situationist thought, insofar as the political and architectural project of both is ultimately
the same: democracy as the inclusion and respect of those who have been excluded and denigrated.
At heart, it could be said that both situationist thought and speculative materialism are radically
democratic insofar as they imply a demand for the recognition of all members of the cosmological
whole. As Debord writes:
This ‘historic mission of establishing truth in the world’ can be carried
out neither by the isolated individual nor by atomised and manipulated
masses, but only and always by the class that is able to dissolve all
classes by reducing all power to the de-alienating form of realised
democracy – to councils in which practical theory verifies itself and
surveys its own actions. . . this is possible only when individuals are ‘directly linked to the universal history’ and dialogue arms itself to impose
its own conditions.34
Water, having been erstwhile relegated to the level of instrumental necessity is here figured as delineable actor, incorporated into the compositional assemblages of the city not as the merely subservient correlate to the anthropocentric composition of the urban as ‘human habitat’ but as collaborative
actor in the ongoing construction of the urban as the collective home of all its inhabitants, erstwhile
considered ‘human’ or otherwise.
However, each of these conceptual toolkits alone cannot sufficiently address the political and
architectural banalization of water, but can only go so far towards including and codifying a place
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for water in an articulated collective of the kind that Latour describes in the quote above. It is only
together that they offer us not only a means of speaking about things like water itself, in the sense of
“an ontology of objects in general, not a taxonomy of human comportment,”35 as Harman writes, and
also a means of substantively engaging with the political and architectural exclusion of such things
from the composition and day to day excise of the collective (again, in their being figured merely
politically, or merely architecturally). Speculative Materialism, as a strain or type of philosophical realism, is useful in that it offers us, as Graham Harman writes, “a serious effort to defend the credentials
of an independent reality beyond appearance, or a substance beyond every series of qualities, of a
world-in-itself in which the human subject plays just one limited part.”36 Though, were one to establish
the credibility of a world comprised of things-in-themselves of which we could speak, one would still
lack a means by which to interpret the project of a collective commons proper to those things. That
is, were one to establish the ontological autonomy of water, how would one then discern the project
of a commons proper to water as a newly recognized member of the metropolitan assembly? As the
editors of The Speculative Turn volume write, “a more serious issue for the new realisms and materialisms is the question of whether they can provide any grounds or guidelines for ethical and political
action. Can they justify normative ideals?”37 The issue, however, is that there is no objectified ‘they’
that must justify such ethical and political action – the critique of a merely ethical ethics or a merely
political politics notwithstanding – rather there ought to be merely an ‘us’ which includes all the constituent members of an urban ecological whole, to whom the project of such a commons would be
proper.

Anticipated Objection: The Ontological Indifference of Water to Human Concerns
The argument against all this, however, goes something to the effect that if one were to establish an
autonomous ontological standing for the world outside of ourselves, then there would need to exist
some segment of ontology that would be irreducible or incommensurable with human concerns and
politics. “Our knowledge may be irreducibly tied to politics,” as the editors of the Speculative Turn
volume note, “yet to suggest that reality is also thus tied is to project an epistemological problem into
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the ontological realm.”38 This is true, but the fact that nonhuman assemblages may potentially be
otherwise indifferent to their implication within a politics, and exist completely outside the scope of
politics at one time or another (as, for instance, the water at the bottom of the ocean does before being reinserted into the cycle through tidal mixing), does not mean that their fates and well-being are
not integrally and inextricably tied up with erstwhile considered human political projects (and the limitations inherent to their being figured as merely political therein), nor that they would not benefit from
having their constitutive makeup understood and worked with. As Engels writes, “we by no means
rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature. . . we,
with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst.”39 Recognizing our implication
and imbrication within what is normally sectioned off as ‘nature,’ apart from us, requires a workingwith – in the sense of an articulated cooperation – by the erstwhile considered human and nonhuman
actors that make up the entirety of the urban ecological.
So while there is admittedly horizons of ontology that are not currently under the auspices
of ‘human’ politics, in order to “uncover the limits and potentials of a politics oriented by speculative
thought”40 we should say that the project of a commons is nevertheless always relevant to ontology
insofar as the fates of those horizons of ontology not currently in contact with the margins of ‘human’ politics are nevertheless bound up with the fates of those human politics, whether conceived
holistically or delimited to their spectacular merely political form. We need to “acknowledge the
need to forge new conditions of articulation between politics, epistemology, and metaphysics,”41
as Ray Brassier writes – as “the failure to change the world may not be unrelated to the failure to
understand it”42 – but at the same time, in order to critique and foster alternatives to the ways in
which water has been banalized, and denied this understanding in the contemporary metropolis,
we need a positive compositional orientation that is commensurable with and capable of accommodating the kind of Political Ecology of water infrastructure being established here. Such a positive
unitary project can be found in the work of Guy Debord and the Situationist International, a group
of French radicals in the 1960s.
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Political Ecology of the Situationist City
The situationists were urbanists in the truest sense – as opposed to those were called ‘urbanists’ at
the time – in that they fed off the energies of the city and tapped into those flows of urban life to find
that which was novel, creative, life-affirming, and dangerous. Situationist thought “was founded upon
the belief that general revolution would originate in the appropriation and alteration of the material
environment and its space,”43 as Simon Sadler writes, indeed as Attila Kotayani and Raoul Vaneigem
once wrote together, “we have invented the architecture and the urbanism that cannot be realized
without the revolution of everyday life, that is to say the appropriation of conditioning by everyone, its
unlimited enrichment and triumph.”44 One of their ranks, Günther Feuerstein, refused to even abide
by the conventional functionalist abstraction and alienation from the environmental conditions of the
city, nor would he allow his apartment to mirror the epistemic and ideological insularity that he perceived in the way that apartments are ‘meant’ to function, as Sadler writes of Feuerstein:
Ripping out his air conditioning and throwing open his windows, he
could swelter, shiver, and struggle to hear himself think above the roar
of the city; later he might bump and hurt himself against one of the
myriad sharp corners in his flat and sit at his wobbly table and on his
uncomfortable sofa.”45
Indeed, soon after their founding in 1957 the Situationist International started publishing positive
not only positive political and architectural critiques – that is, how they thought the city should be,
what should be changed, what should be demolished, what should be possible – but critiques of
the normative conceptions of politics and architecture as such. Indeed after several years of simply
conceiving of politics and architecture differently, it became clear to the situationists that politics and
architecture alone would be insufficient, and that only by a thoroughgoing shift in every register of our
relation to the city and the materials that comprise it, politically, architecturally, ethically, poetically,
ideologically and epistemologically, would we be able to effect any real change.
This project became known to the situationists as ‘Unitary Urbanism,’ the effort to reconceptualise the city as a space in which such an inclusive emancipatory kind of everyday life might unfold. “It is known that initially the situationists wanted at the very least to build cities, the environment
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suitable to the unlimited deployment of new passions,” as Guy Debord wrote of their then budding
enterprise, “but of course this was not easy and so we found ourselves forced to do much more.”46 In
other words, the situationist project is conducive and commensurable with the aims of the speculative
materialist ontology insofar as it is not simply the alteration of one or another form within everyday
life, be it political or architectural, ideology or the episteme fostered by it, but rather the thoroughgoing revolution of all of these at once, a revolution of everyday life in the sense of a radical alteration
of all forms of everyday life. Their interrogation of the city and the politics and architecture that populate it is not so much aimed at simply those politics and architectures, but rather aimed at opening up
– in much the same respect as speculative materialism – the possibility of their being otherwise; at
the point of origin of a new arche, one that would ground something itself radically new.
Urbanism, that is, city planning or architecture when defined in the limited sense of that which
is proper to the architectural realm (as opposed to ‘an architecture of life,’ perhaps, or ‘a politics of
sense’), is described by the situationists as “capitalism’s method for taking over the natural and human environment.” To be sure, when conceived of as solely the shaping of buildings rather than the
shaping of lives led and environments inhabited, politics and architectures not only serve the logic
of capitalism’s taking over the natural and human environment, but more accurately produce them
as discreet and distinct categories in the first place. “Following its logical development towards total
domination,” as Debord writes, “capitalism now can and must refashion the totality of space into its
own particular décor.”47 The ideological instantiation of itself within the metropolitan landscape is here
understood not as the development of habitat that it otherwise masquerades as, but rather as the
patristic replication of forms that will encourage more of the same. It produces materials like water as
separate and inert, commodifiable and merely phenomenal, and then engenders political and architectural forms, as political or architectural, that will ensure this separation’s endless repetition and
banalization. “The tautological character of the spectacle stems from the fact that its means and ends
are identical” as Debord writes, “it is the sun that never sets over the empire of modern passivity.
It covers the entire surface of the globe, endlessly basking in its own glory.”48 The cyclical passage
through ideological and epistemic banalization to political and architectural figuration that will encourage such separation, alienated comportment, and reduction to material’s merely phenomenal charac-
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ter, is here revealed to be the particular project of a system whose aims are ultimately identical to the
modes of its enacting those aims, its own endless and ostensibly seamless reinstantiation into the
contours and content of everyday life.
Indeed as Debord concludes, “the spectacle is the acme of ideology because it fully exposes
and manifests the essence of all ideological systems: the impoverishment, enslavement and negation of real life.”49 The specific spectacle that inheres in the contemporary metropolis is the spectacle of global neoliberal capitalism, an ideological edifice which, as Maria Kaika has so wonderfully
explained in City of Flows, has made water in the city aesthetically present or aesthetically absent
in such a way as to accord only with its own reinscription into the built urban environment. That is,
neoliberal ideology enslaves and negates water in the city both by making it disappear beneath the
sheath of the urban environment and also by making it appear within certain sanctioned sites in their
sanctioned and commodified form.

Saturated Fictions: Orientation Towards the Spectacular City
In order to address the totalizing nature of the spectacle as it is manifest towards us in everyday life,
the situationists developed an ethic of the city that was aimed towards addressing its wholesale negation of life and the real, and termed it ‘Unitary Urbanism’ in contrast to the politics and architectures
of their day. “Unitary Urbanism first becomes clear in the use of the whole of arts and techniques as
means cooperating in and integral composition of this environment,”50 as the situationists note – at
once “the fruit of a collective creativity of a new sort”51 and “linked to a qualitative change of comportment and way of life,”52 Unitary Urbanism was proposed as the means of “a true collective creation,
at the level of art.”53 From within the existent figurations of the contemporary western cityscape their
project was the thoroughgoing negation of these figurations and the production of something new,
the productive reconfiguration of all registers of everyday life in accordance with a radically democratic reassessment of who and what is qualified to contribute to a newly minted collective. Theirs
was a recognition of the banalization inflicted upon the urban assemblage by the structural conditions
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of that assemblage’s incipient organization and through this recognition they sought to redefine the
conditions under which actors might not only delineate themselves and cooperatively coexist within
that urban assemblage but continuously mold and shift that urban assemblage towards more liberating and emancipatory forms. As Debord writes:
The present-day planning of cities, which appears as a geology of lies,
will make way with Unitary Urbanism, for a technique for defending the
always threatened conditions of liberty, just as individuals – who do not
yet exist as such – will freely construct their own history.54
In other words, in the excise of Unitary Urbanism as a program which articulates the false codification of our relation to the world – where world serves as mere correlate to and component within a
dialectic of originary privileged beings and preordained categories and organizations of reality – the
denizens of the city are compelled through Unitary Urbanism to rethink not only the structural and
geometric forms of politics and architecture, but to fundamentally rethink their very existence within
the cosmological whole and how that whole might be otherwise organized and structured; to envision
a future not only for themselves, but for the actors that are yet to be palpably defined but nevertheless have stake within that future assembly. As Latour writes:
The venerable word ‘Republic’ is admirably suited to our task, if we
agree to bring out the overtones of the underlying Latin word res,
‘thing’” as Latour points out, “as has been frequently noted, it is as if
Political Ecology found again in the res publica, the ‘public thing,’ the
ancient etymology that has linked the word for thing and the word for
judicial assembly since the dawn of time: Ding and thing, res and reus.55
One of the primary tools developed by the situationists in the pursuit of an analysis of the ways in
which the city acted upon its denizens, the modes of life and living – or their negation – that were fostered by different districts or different flows of city life, was the Derive – the psychogeographical ‘drift’
through the city, or, in other words, a purposeful but directionless walk. Noting its latin root ‘derivare’
McKenzie Wark places particular emphasis on its etymological progenies ‘derive’ and ‘river.’ The
derive was their psychogeographical access to the methods of the spectacle’s producing disinterest
and also the ways in which it might be productively subverted, or detourned. “Its whole field of meaning is aquatic, conjuring up flows, channels, eddies, currents, and also drifting, sailing or tacking
against the wind,” as Wark writes, “it suggests a space and time of liquid movement, sometimes predictable but sometimes turbulent. . . the word derive condenses a whole attitude to life, the sort one
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might acquire in the backwaters of Saint-Germain-des-Pres.”56 The drift, as it came to be known, was
a method for interrogating the construction of environments and what they sometimes inadvertently
gave rise to, but often what they were purposefully and strategically configured to engender. As Alan
Dunning and Paul Woodrow write of their contemporary spin on – and digital reconceptualization of
– the derive, it “emerged out of an interest in the seen and unseen, the half-percieved and mispercieved things at the limits of our perception, and in the reanimation of the lost bodies and past events
that constitute this invisible world. The world is not entirely what it appears to be, and the surface of
the visible world needs only to be lightly scratched to reveal the invisible worlds above and below.”57
Indeed what is most salient in the composition of the contemporary city is not necessarily what is
seen, and meant to be seen, but rather what is inherently and specifically composed as unseen. It is
here that we find water, in the dramatic performance of its having been banalized: in its either having
been entirely visually excluded, as is the case through most of its incorporation into the contemporary metropolis, or its occasional feature as mollified bourgeois ornament, its fetishized commodified
form, “architectonic prostitution”58 as the futurists so eloquently phrased it.
The archaeology of water’s having been all but erased from the perceptible cityscape must in
a certain sense be treated as having originated in the same movement of the enlightenment that both
inaugurated the conditions of the spectacle’s totalisation and gave rise to our ontological scepticism
– or ignorance – towards the autonomy of materiality outside of the correlationist pairing of thought
and being, human and world. The critique levied against Kant, in particular, by the proponents of a
speculative materialism is such that, in his haste to escape the otherwise intractable articulations
of the conditions of knowledge offered on the one hand by the empiricists, and on the other by the
rationalists, he foreclosed the possibility of any real knowledge whatsoever; thereby inscribing an
indifference towards the fate of ‘the things themselves’ within any otherwise positive political project
that would accept his premises in their philosophical composition. “If Immanuel Kant deserves credit
for anything, it is for recognizing the trench-warfare conditions of the metaphysics of his time, with
its increasingly pointless proofs and counterproofs” as Graham Harman writes, though as he continues, “Kant’s unfortunate solution was to adopt an agnostic attitude toward the nature of things-in-
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themselves: the rough equivalent of escaping trench warfare by wearing earplugs.”59 Indeed in the
articulation of a positive political project that derived not from an earnest relationship with the thingsthemselves, but rather from a transcendental dialectic, Kant also inaugurated the very enterprise that
would so effectively capitalize on this alienation, i.e. modernity as such. It is in the language of modernity that Maria Kaika so admirably lays out how water was appropriated and striated by the logics
of the city and eventually hidden behind, underneath, and within the forms that resulted.
“Despite their importance for the function of the contemporary city
– technology networks are today largely hidden, opaque, invisible;
disappearing underground, locked into pipes, cables, conduits, tubes
passages, and electronic waves. . . however, urban networks have
not always been opaque. Along with their ‘urban dowry’ (water towers,
dams, pumping stations, power plants, gas stations, etc.), they have
undergone important historical changes in their visual role and their
material importance in the cityscape.”60
Water networks in the metropolitan landscape were developed in symbolic lockstep with a generalized apotheosis of the promise of modernity, the enlightenment project and its meta-narrative
of historical salvation through technical-rationality and the advancement of ‘human’ concerns. In
the first half of the 20th century water networks could be said to have been literal maps of a faith in
the advents of modernity, as Kaika writes, “urban space became saturated with pipelines, cables,
tubes, and ducts of various sizes and colors; things that celebrated the mythic images of early
modernity, literally carrying the idea of progress into the urban domain and providing the confirmation that the road to a better society was under construction and paved with networks.”61 At this
point water did indeed feature heavily in our politics and architecture, but featured only at the level
of fashion; allowed to transgress its ontological subjugation – though not challenge it, importantly
– only through its having become commodified and fetishized. Indeed as Kaika notes the visitation and appreciation of water logistics used to be a prestigious activity for the middle and upper
classes of both America, who would visit dams, and Europe, who would take part in boat tours of
the sewage systems of London and Paris62.
Having been entirely given over to the enlightenment telos, however, and having abandoned
themselves to the modernist line-of-flight, the West eventually came to perceive themselves as
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enmeshed and implicated in a kind of split between the promise of modernity and its actual consequences. Indeed as Kaika writes, “by the middle of the 20th century, cities in the industrialized world
were left with the uncomfortable situation of being filled with material statements of an unfulfilled (and
unfulfillable) promise, accentuated by two world wars and a period of economic depression. Urban
technology networks and construction became material embodiments of disillusionment.”63 Indeed
disillusionment is, if not the means, at least one of the means that the spectacle employs in its constructive reinscription of alienation, not only in politics and architecture, but in the ideological structuration of everyday life. It maintains a rotating cast of actors who are allowed to appear at times, but
who nevertheless lack any durable position as autonomous member of the assembly that the spectacle otherwise prescribes. As Debord writes, “while all the technical forces of capitalism contribute
towards various forms of separation, urbanism provides the material foundation for those forces and
prepares the ground for their deployment.”64 The infrastructural necessity of water distribution networks did not at the same time necessitate water’s inclusion in any other sense but an instrumental
summoning at the end of those pipes and conduits. Having progressively lost their symbolic import
as fetishized objects of the promise of modernity, as Kaika notes, “the networks became buried
underground, invisible, banalized, and relegated to a marginal, subterranean urban underworld.”65
Indeed what is psychogeographically palpable in any drift of the contemporary cityscape is the virtual
nonexistence of a visible testament to the proliferation of water logistics.
For the spectacle, having established an episteme in which materials are only important and
accounted for in their phenomenal character, the visual exclusion of water distribution networks can
therefore be understood as its ultimate mode of banishment. As Kaika writes:
Their contemporary hidden form contributed to severing the process
of the social transformation of nature from the process of urbanization,
blurring the tense relationship between nature and the city further. . . the
apparently self-evident commodification of nature that fundamentally
underpins a market-based society not only obscures the social relations
of power inscribed therein, but also permits the disconnection of the
perpetual flows of transformed and commodified nature from its inevitable foundation, i.e., the transformation of nature. 66
With the qualification that, in contrast to Kaika’s articulation, we should instead say ‘the production
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of nature’ in the sense of its having been produced to be transformed in the first place. The separation imposed upon the constitutive actors within everyday life is such that water is not only separated from ‘nature’ but separated from a ‘nature’ which is itself already produced in its having been
ideologically separated and produced as distinct from the urban ecological, and, more generally,
the cosmological, whole.

Veiling Water: Ontological Obfuscation in the Spectacular City
What is veiled in the constructive burial of distribution networks is not simply the social relations of
power that require such burial, but the ontological negation of the real that is inherent to those social
relations as such, i.e. the very core of the spectacle’s self-production and repetition within everyday
life. In hiding the means by which nature is at once produced as distinct, originary – undifferentiated
and available towards us, ‘for us’ not ‘in itself’ – the spectacle constructs the ground upon which its
own conditions appear as self-evident and without origin. It has produced, then, a city in which water
is not only barred and excluded from the constitutive processes of the commons, be they political or
architectural or otherwise, but is structurally cloistered in a position from which it cannot, on its own,
emerge. Insofar as the spectacle isolates and regulates the visual exclusion of water networks it
denies them one of the primary requisites that the spectacle itself posits as necessary for recognition
within the cosmological whole, i.e. mediated phenomenal appearance. As Kaika writes:
“High modernity with its crusade towards rationalization and clarity
created a city of rhizomatic underground networks, which ceaselessly
transform nature into city. The burial of networks was so successful that
many of them are today undecipherable. The ideal city, the new utopia,
was clean and sanitized, both in visual and literary terms. Water, for
example, as Latour and Le Bourhis note, has become truly invisible, or
has been turned systematically into something self-evident, an apparent
triviality, located simply at the mouth of the tap. This ‘silencing’ of water
and other networked relations rendered it into what it is not – H2O.67
The production of a systematic analog for water itself, the commodified substance that appears to us
from within the geometry of the spectacle itself ‘as’ water, allows the thoroughgoing ontological denial
of water even when we have it in our very hands. The politics and architecture that the spectacle
gives rise to therefore has a means of reinserting itself in the relation, producing its mediation of our
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relation to water even in the moments of our most intimate being-with water, that is, the substitution
of H2O as such with its spectacular analog, metabolized and commodified ‘water,’ ‘good’ water as
opposed to ‘bad’ as Kaika writes. As Deleuze writes, “heat is movement, water is composed of H2O,
but movement as object of thought is only constituted by negating that which it explains – heat qua
system of sensible qualities. Equally, when we arrive at H2O, there is water no longer.”68 This is what
the situationist Constant means when he writes that “the present condition. . . has lost touch with
reality” to the extent that it is not simply the visual exclusion of water that bars it from being ontologically recognized and allowed to contribute to the collective composition of everyday life, but rather it
is the other way around, the ontological banalization of water is such that we do not see water itself
even when – today, though more commonly in the first half of the 20th century – right in front of our
eyes. As the authors of the Situationist International wrote:
“Today at a time when, despite certain appearances, more than ever
(after a century of struggles and the liquidation between the two world
wars of the whole classical workers movement, which represented the
force of the general contestation, by ruling sectors whether traditional
or of a new type) the dominant world passes itself off as definitive, on
the basis of an enrichment and an infinite extention of an irreplaceable
model, the comprehension of this world can only be based on contestation. . . this contestation has truth or realism only as the contestation of
the totality.”69
In other words we have to stop fighting amongst ourselves, the nascent actors who are to populate
the proposed demos, and start challenging the situation which holds currently in which we have been
brought together but brought together only under the auspices of our ultimately being nevertheless
not ‘with’ each other in any substantive or recognitional sense. The appeal to realism or materialism
here serves as a will towards the overturn of that banalized and denied ontological determinancy
of ‘objects,’ the “contrast between their subterranean reality and the series of phenomenal surfaces
they generate in our encounter with them,”70 the former having been distanced from the later by the
conscious and purposeful arrangement of, and striation within, the politics and architectures of the
contemporary cityscape.
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Of Spectacular or Situationst Cities and their Waters
It is therefore not enough to merely construct an alternative politics or an alternative architecture from
within the terms and specifications of the already existent topology of the spectacular city, its social
relations having evolved with not only the means but indeed the presumption of its reinscription as
the basis of any contingent or ancillary rearticulation. As Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe notes, “in
order to grasp these levels of social reality, especially practices and behaviours. . . we must define a
simultaneously ecological and cultural space, without effecting a dissociation between the two orders
of phenomena.”71 In other words it is imperative that, in the pursuit of any new politics or architecture,
we understand and begin from the premise that the ontological horizon of the cosmological whole is
not itself distinct and irreconcilable with the realm of ‘human’ concerns, but that it is instead the case
that erstwhile considered ‘human’ experience and the ethico-political enterprises that it produces occur essentially and fundamentally within that cosmological whole, and within the sphere of the newly
conceived commons that is proper to it. To be sure, this is a premise which holds radically democratic possibilities insofar as it is fundamentally irreconcilable with the spectacle, in its mediation
and separation, as it is configured today. And begin moreover from the subsequent premise that it is
merely a frequent aspect of such productions that ‘human’ concerns and the cosmological whole are
themselves produced as distinct and irreconcilable. Rather than any qualified or provisional rearticulation of existent constitutions of the collective, the aim must be, as Lefebvre writes, “the conquest
of everyday life, the recreation of the everyday and the recuperation of the forces which have been
alienated in aesthetics, scattered through politics, lost in abstraction, severed from what is possible
and what is real.”72 In attempting to reconnect water to its place within what is possible and what is
real, we should like to say that we are also, with Lefebvre, interested in reconnecting ourselves with
what is possible and what is real, because we ought not effect a dissociation between them either.
These lines of flight are ultimately the same effort insofar as in reconstituting the assembly to account
for the actors and networks that arise around water, we indeed need to also reconstitute the assembly to account for what ‘we ourselves’ are in the same terms. It will require, as McKenzie Wark writes,
“a coming-into-being through the encounter with something other, an encounter which necessitates
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a moment of both transformation and reflection.”73 Indeed such a reconstitution – wherein even we
ourselves are reconstituted as a member of such a newly conceived commons – will be done in
concert with, and on the same ontological standing as, the materiality that is to occupy its assembly.
“It will have to engage in politics,” as Latour notes, “an activity to which we had finally gotten rather
unaccustomed, given the extent to which confidence in Science had allowed us to postpone the day
of reckoning in the belief that the common world had already been constituted, for the most part,
under the auspices of nature.”74 Though again it will have to engage in not only politics, as in the civil
collaboration between erstwhile considered ‘human’ actors and the actors and networks that become
evident through this project of Unitary Urbanism, aimed at the contours of the real within the contemporary cityscape, the assembly will be holistically built. Not built as a determined and determinate
space with the intention of being in a sense ‘done,’ but rather will be itself always determinately indeterminate, not done, not complete, provisional and contingent, as the presumption of and prefigurement by a philosophical materialism or realism will necessitate that there will always be new actors
and new networks that are coming into and going out of existence that will need to be accounted for
by the whole. This is especially true of water, where its material, its acts and its surrounding network,
tends to flow, flux, sluice and seep, to leak into new arrangements that challenge the ossification of
the assemblages it pertains to.
In the recognizing the ideologically produced absence of an earnest and respectful recognition of the material that constitutes the world – not only inaugurated by the enlightenment project
but itself codified as the politics and architecture of what the situationists call the spectacle – the
response is a Unitary Urbanism which struggles against this totalisation by seeking philosophical and
psychogeographical access to the real. But the response is moreover conditioned by the engagement with that real, in the sense of building something which stands in opposition to the ossified
irreality of the spectacle, by building something outside of its capacity to appropriate and appreciating
such developments on the same basis. Indeed as McKenzie Wark writes, “it is by attempting to transform everyday life that the contours of the real are encountered.”75 It is the contemporary philosophical realisms which have sought to address the post-Kantian metaphysics of the real – in contrast to
the post-structuralist indifference towards and/or denial of ‘the real’ – but it was the situationists, long
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before, who set their course towards it and lived and acted in a manner as though it was actually
there. The situationists, rather than presuming themselves to be ecstatic, lived ecstatically – they correctly identified life and the real as stemming from ultimately the same being-beholden to the cosmological whole – and, through their having lived ecstatically, their having separated themselves from
the world of separation, through their attempt to build something that would speak to an ‘outside’ the
margins of the spectacle, they provided a model. They gave us a positive program commensurable
with the philosophical affirmation of and speculative grasping towards the contours of the real itself.
Together with the speculative materialists, then, it is in their terms that we should like to talk about
water, how it exists with us in the urban environment, and why neither a merely architectural architecture nor a merely political politics is proper to it.
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Chapter Two
Against Architecture: Ontological Urbanism I
Recently, in Potsdamerplatz, the largest construction site in Berlin,
the co-ordinated movement of dozens of gigantic cranes was
staged as an art performance – doubtless perceived by many
uninformed passers-by as part of an intense construction activity. . . I myself made the opposite blunder during a trip to Berlin:
I noticed along and above all the main streets numerous large
blue tubes and pipes, as if the intricate cobweb of water, phone,
electricity, and so on, was no longer hidden beneath the earth,
but displayed in public. My reaction was, of course, that this
was probably another of those postmodern art performances
whose aim was, this time, to reveal the intestines of the town, its
hidden inner machinery, in a kind of equivalent to displaying on
video the palpitation of our stomach or lungs – I was soon proved
wrong, however, when friends pointed out to me that what I saw
was merely part of the standard maintenance and repair of the
city’s underground service network.
– Slavoj Žižek

The problem with considering architecture as a distinct and autonomous discipline unto itself, as far
as the Situationist International was concerned, was that doing so played into the basic and inalienable logic of the spectacle, i.e. that which brings us all together but brings us together as nonetheless
separate. The spectacle as the machinic ‘technology of separation,’ inscribed in and indeed forever
reinscribing itself into not only the extant environments of everyday life but moreover into the fundmamental categories and partitions – divisions of labor whether material or intellectual – applied to the
development of those environments. To be an architect, or to identify this way, was to have already
acquiesced to countless procedural and paradigmatic positions that allowed for then, and allow for
now, the continued and continuing function of spectacular society. Andrew Karvonen parses the distinction out in his study on urban stormwater flows, The Politics of Urban Runoff: Nature, Technology
and the Sustainable City, as being between ‘urban ecologist’ and ‘engineer,’ but the principle remains
very much the same, the former seeks to create a space in which extant environments contribute
meaningfully, albeit under the auspices of a reconfigured and, for our purposes, revolutionary kind
of commons, whereas the latter merely seeks to impose form upon those environments in such a
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manner as to perpetually recreate the conditions of the prevailing and, for our purposes, conservative social and political arena. To ‘do’ architecture, then – to be an ‘engineer’ in all the term’s most
impositional conservative resonances – would be to merely reproduce the existing and wantonly
insufficient determinations of urbanism that had characterized it as a discipline in which people were
literally qualified as ‘architects’ in contradistinction to their inherent capacity to be, as the situationists
held, holistic constructors of novel situations and creative formations of everyday life, of which the
terrain would be only a particular, distil and rarified aspect thereof. They identified the practice of architecture with spectacular society, then, to the extent that the practice of architecture implied certain
constructs to which architects could or could not legitimately speak.
One such construction that we ought to be breaking down, then, in our otherwise situationist
resistance to, and incredulity towards, a hermetic determination of the architect – that is, in our abandonment of the term and derision towards the ‘architect’ as he who acquiesces to the spectacular
‘architecture’ as such – is a rigid distinction between inside and outside. This construct is spectacular
in that it denies the otherwise undeniable, that architectural constructs do not, in actual fact, function
with any clean and delineable break – beyond one or another spectacular articulation – between their
being sourced by materials from, and their returning materials to, the colloquially and conveniently
termed ‘outside’ world. That is, these boundaries ought to be collapsed into the more honest and earnest determinations of liminality that actually characterize the alternately termed ‘inside’ and ‘outside’
of metropolitan architectural constructs. Which is why, as Debord writes, “the most reduced element
of Unitary Urbanism is not the house but the architectural complex, which is the union of all the factors conditioning an environment, or a sequence of environments colliding at the scale of the constructed situation.”76 It is not that the colloquially considered ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of an architectural
form do not exist, they do, obviously, but rather that the boundaries that such colloquial deployment
of ‘inside’ and outside’ rely on, like the wall, for example, are convenient and lazy, but actually speak
very little to where the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ begin and end, if they really begin and end at all. “There
is always the excess of a third space which gets lost in the division into outside and inside,” as Žižek
writes, “an intermediate space which is disavowed: we all know it exists, but we do not really accept
its existence – it remains ignored and (mostly) unsayable.”77 Indeed one would be hard-pressed to
deny wholly the realities of infrastructure rote large, but this space, to the extent that it is acknowl-
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edged in the popular consciousness – the ‘we all know it exists’ in the limited sense that people more
or less say ‘yes, there are things like pipes and conduits behind these walls’ – is misunderstood, and
is precisely ideologically developed, socially and historically, in such a way as to mitigate any real
appreciation for the productive relations that bring material ‘in’ and ‘out’ of otherwise ‘architectural’
constructs, and hence in such a way as to de-emphasize any real appreciation for the particular reality or ontological autonomy of this space.
That is, precisely as Žižek says, ‘we do not really accept its existence,’ but rather capitulate
only to its ideological echo, its formal necessity, the ossification of a kind of generalized Piaget object
permanence to such an extent that when one says ‘there are pipes behind these walls’ they really
mean either ‘I saw pipes behind these walls once so I assume they are still there,’ or ‘I saw pipes
behind a wall once, so I assume they are present here as well’ or merely ‘I have been told that pipes
are the things that are behind walls, so I assume there are pipes behind these walls,’ rather than for
a second really contemplating what it is like there with the pipes, in and amongst the pipes, rather
than for a second really contemplating the space in and of itself, as a space, and not simply the most
salient edifice of a metabolized and commodified nature in our service.
Indeed this limited determination of the understanding that ‘there are pipes in these walls’
is developed in what Simondon would call a hylomorphic fashion, wherein the masterful ‘architect’
imposes his totalizing vision upon inert and infinitely malleable matter, rather than in Protevi, taking
from Simondon, has called a ‘transductive’ fashion, wherein there would be something of an appreciation for the impossibility of this kind of masterful and totalizing imposition of form onto matter.
As John Protevi writes, “hylomorphic conceptions of production are based in the social conditions of
slave society: all production is credited to the direction provided by the eidetic vision and ordering
command of the architect/master/ruler.”78 That is, in the ontological reduction of material to its possible ontological mode of ‘for us’ rather than its possible ontological mode ‘in itself’ we tacitly condone
the development of architectural forms – though the extent to which this is understood or acknowledged is negligible at best, to be sure. Paradoxically it is such that this ideological blind is developed
hylomorphically to engender the perception that hylomorphic determinations of architectural forms
are themselves at all possible. They are not, or not completely at any rate. The only construction that
the developmental mode of hylomorphism is capable of producing is construction of its own illusion,
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that is, the illusion of its own efficacy when projected upon the material realm.
Because the logic of appropriative spectacular capital acts upon the terrain of everyday life in
a totalized and totalizing way, any delimited practice of ‘reform,’ like an architecture with pretensions
of working against such totalisation could only do so, at least in any real sense, outside the auspices
of such systems, outside of what Deleuze and Guattari have otherwise referred to as “transcendent
paranoiac law.” Paradoxically, then, it is only under the conditions of the wholesale overturn or evacuation of the spectacle that piecemeal approaches to urban water infrastructure like architecture would
hold any meaning, while, importantly, under such conditions no such piecemeal approaches would
occur, replaced as they would be by a holistic practice of the construction of everyday life which
respects and accounts for the ontological autonomy of its constituent practicioners, whether erstwhile
considered human or non-human, namely the practice of Unitary Urbanism. As it is in the Situationist
International:
For the method of experimental utopia, if it is truly to correspond to its
project, must obviously embrace the totality, i.e. carrying it out would
lead not to a ‘new urbanism’ but to a new use of life, a new revolutionary praxis. It is also the lack of a connection between the project for a
passionate reordering of architecture and other forms of conditioning,
and its rejection in terms of the whole society, that constitutes the weakness of Gunther Feuerstein’s theses, published in the same issue of the
journal of the German section of the S.I., despite the interest of several
points, in particular his notion of the unpredictable mass, ‘representing
chance and also the smallest organization of objects comprised by an
event.’ Feuerstein’s ideas on an ‘unpremeditated architecture,’ which
follow the S.I. line, can only be understood in all their consequences,
and carried out, precisely by overcoming the separate problem of architecture and the solutions that would be reserved for it in the abstract.79
That is, again, the visual exclusion of productive relations, their contrived aesthetic absence, contributes to an epistemological atrophy – that is, a withering necessity for people to at all know or
understand the means by which architectural constructs are in actuality connected, networked, and
contingent upon each other and upon systems and assemblages of circulation. And this epistemic
atrophy itself gives rise to an ontological agnosticism towards the autonomous being of the materials,
like water, that make up those systems and assemblages of circulation. The determination of the architect as the one who oversees that which has been classically interpreted as ‘architectural,’ is here
understood to be he who builds up the false perception of their own constructs as self-contained,
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isolate and consummate, rather than extensions of, and dependent upon, the material reality of
everyday life. As Lewis Mumford writes, the modern city has classically implied “a tendency to loosen
the bonds that connect its inhabitants with nature and to transform, eliminate, or replace its earthbound aspects, covering the natural site with an artificial environment that enhances the dominance
of man and encourages an illusion of complete independence from nature.”80 Indeed it is precisely
because we develop – or more accurately that we have allowed others to develop – environments
which represent us as distinct and hermetically separate from the cosmological whole that we then,
unsurprisingly, believe ourselves to be exactly that, and produce the kind of social and political forms
that are premised upon that belief. As Karvonen writes:
Beyond the entrenched modes of thinking about human/nonhuman
relations as well as the social structures that reify these modern dichotomies, one of the most formidable barriers to realizing new relations
between humans and nonhumans is the material obduracy of the built
environment. The perennial and seemingly permanent infrastructure of
the nineteenth century slowly crumbles under the feet of urban residents but the logic of these networks persists in physical form and can
only be removed or reoriented at high cost. As such, there is a tendency
in urban development processes to perpetuate the nature/culture relations that were instituted over a century ago because of the physical
resistance to widespread change.”81
By material obduracy he means the scripting of self-perpetuation within the construction of architectural forms, which are premised upon a dialectic of capitulation to a delimited field, architecture,
on the one hand, and unfettered fascistic totalisation within that field, the architect, on the other. In
acquiescing to the particular purview of architecture, and the particular practices and proceedures of
‘the architect,’ we guarauntee ourselves the penance of future urban environments in which it will be
yet harder and harder to conceive or imagine otherwise.
Architecture – itself delimited and sequestered by spectacular ideology to a series of regional
ontologies, epistemes or modes of knowing of what the architect can and cannot speak to – sets
itself upon the task of reproducing in material environments the same sense of control that underpins spectacular ideology. The homeowner or proprietor of one or another architectural construct
feels ‘ownership’ of not only their architectural construct but of the contrived ‘construct’ of distinction
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between its ideologically constituted inside and its ideologically constituted outside, as though they
themselves were the arbiter of the visual exclusion of the third space (and as such the arbiter of their
own ignorance thereof, ‘the infinite sunshine of the spotless mind’).
This is not to say they lay claim to the third space itself, of course, but rather specifically to its
aesthetic and subsequently epistemic abolition – ‘out of sight, out of mind,’ the homeowner or proprietor might say, were they in a position to consider it, in spite of it being nevertheless there, mediating,
as it necessarily must, between what is to their minds understood only in the strict binary of inside
and outside, it having been ideologically provided to them constituted and commodified as such. As
Kaika writes, “it is precisely this visual exclusion of production networks, of metabolized nature and of
social power relations, that contributes greatly to the production of a sense of the familiar inside one’s
home. In a deceitful way, remaining unfamiliar with the above socio-natural networks is a prerequisite for feeling familiar within one’s own home.”82 And by acquiescing to the spectacular ideological
banishment of material reality – aesthetically and, in turn, epistemically – architecture, most especially of the modernist variety, creates the conditions under which the subject proper to that ideology
will continue to acquiesce and material reality will remain interred and considered only in its being
ontologically ‘for us’ rather than ‘in itself’ thusly. As Chtcheglov wrote in the situationist Formulary for
a New Urbanism, “darkness and obscurity are banished by artificial lighting, and the seasons by air
conditioning; night and summer are losing their charm and dawn is disappearing. The man of the cities thinks he has escaped from cosmic reality, but there is no corresponding expansion of his dream
life. The reason is clear: dreams spring from reality and are realized in it.”83 Hence it is only by a
thoroughgoing engagement with, and holistic reclaim of, the third space that a ontologically grounded
urban politics might be worked through; it is only through a radical reconfiguration of our comportment towards not only the ontologically autonomous actors, assemblages, and networks, but moreover that third space, as that which corrodes the ideologically constituted binary of a ‘natural’ inside
and outside, that we might come to speak about novel arrangements of erstwhile considered human
and nonhumans that would comprise what would exceed the otherwise merely architectural.
That is, the third space, by necessity, operates on two registers – on the one hand it is the
literal space of household circulation and exchange, its veins and arteries: plumbing, sewers, and the
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multifarious and libidinal wired connections of electricity, phone, internet, etc., but, on another level,
it is the ‘architectural’ or built figuration and locus of the in-between of the Kantian phenomenal and
noumenal. As Žižek writes, this third space mediates the relation between the phenomenal and that
which exceeds it: “it is as if the waste disappears into some netherworld, beyond our sight and out
of our world. . . We rely on this space, but ignore it – no wonder then that, in science-fiction, horror
films, and techno-thrillers, this dark space between walls is where horrible threats lurk (for spying
machines to monsters or animals like cockroaches and rats). Recall also, in science-fiction architecture, the topos of a building with an extra floor or room not included in the building’s plan (and where,
of course, terrifying things dwell).”84 But it is in his admirable articulation of the ‘no wonder then,’
that Žižek betrays the very mode and method by which spectacular ideology recoups and mollifies
constructs which might otherwise involve and engage with the third space in an open and aesthetic
manner. Or rather, he articulates this mediation of the phenomenal to the noumenal in only one
direction, that of evacuation, which is characteristic of, and uncritically acceptant of, the spectacular
division of inside as ‘good,’ ‘safe,’ ‘hermetic,’ ‘self-contained,’ and the outside as ‘wild,’ ‘pollute,’ ‘unknown,’ ‘uncontrolled,’ and the like. If one only considers the mediation in terms of the merely ‘excremental’ and upon threat of the ‘return of the repressed’ then its ‘no wonder then’ that spectacular architecture has been so successful in proliferating and reproducing those forms which promise to not
only rid you of the former, the excremental, and guard against the latter, the return of the repressed,
the abject, but moreover divest you of such concerns entirely.
The issue, however, is that this one-directional understanding of our relation to the third
space – our having acquiesced to the ideological construction of inside as ‘good,’ ‘safe,’ and outside
as ‘dark,’ ‘foreboding,’ and ‘unknown’ – merely opposes what would otherwise be the first space to
what would otherwise be the second and both reifies and evacuates the third, replicating and reinscribing the division and duality of inside/outside into two nonetheless firmly demarcated places:
beyond the inside but not quite outside, and arriving from outside but not quite inside. But this is the
problem with Žižek’s conception, that is, this is simply not how the third space functions. Not only is
there not a philosophically legitimate architectural ‘inside’ that ought to be functionally distinguished
and distinct from its concomitant architectural ‘outside,’ but in much the same respect as Adrian
MacKenzie’s articulation of ‘the mesh problem,’ that is, the transductive or directional indeterminacy
at the epicenter of a nuclear blast, the third space is itself neither delineable from what would oth-
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erwise be that inside nor from what would otherwise be that outside, but is rather only articulable in
the context of, and as an index for, the flows and circulations that constitute the relations between
one ideologically sectioned space and the other. It represents the relations as the basis of the separation, in spite of the ideological separation being undermined by those very relations. Our spatial
compartmentalizations are simply not reflected in the circulations of the material flows which allow
for their phenomenal survival and reproduction.
Or more specifically our discursive compartmentalizations, our propensity to condescend from
one ideologically instantiated discipline to another, is mirrored in the ideologically contoured built
environment of the city. The discursive and semantic compartmentalizations are reified into corresponding material compartmentalizations, and both serve to inhibit an appreciation for the social and
compositional processes that bring materials like water to us. “The analysis of tools is concerned only
incidentally with the human use of tools. Its real subject matter is the stance of entities themselves in
the midst of reality,”85 as Graham Harman writes, indeed, as he is wont to note, “the tool isn’t ‘used;’ it
is.”86 And to be sure, in spite of our having otherwise given rise to it – when conceiving of the contrivances of urban engineers as the Aristotelian efficient cause of ‘the third space’ – it nevertheless is
only engaged with phenomenally (in spite of its capacity to either engender or mollify a respect for
the ontological autonomy of materials like water that emerge into and disappear away into what is
otherwise ideologically constituted as ‘outside’ from what is otherwise ideologically constituded to be
‘inside’). As Wark notes, “materialism is a kind of turning outward, not directly to the material, because it’s not quite that easy, but to practices that encounter it in ways that can be patterned and that
point towards further ordering of whatever the material might be, but where that ordering is always
understood to be kind of temporary, that whatever ordering we arrive at doesn’t actually have all that
much ontological substance. It’s that from which the rug can always be pulled out from under it by
further discovery, to have not thought you’ve always got it, ‘it’s this, it’s this,’ there’s always upon further inquiry a reason why it’s not.”87 Or rather, even the most benevolent and enlightened formations
of otherwise ‘architectural’ space – even under the auspices of a Unitary Urbanism – cannot make
manifest the noumenal (though in our terms it is already there, comprising any such environment,
whatever its makeup) but rather specific forms of architectural constructs can only serve to open up
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or close off the possibility of a materialist understanding of what comprises those forms, i.e. the material content of urban environments. The alternate composition of urban ecological whole is not then
aimed at actually presenting the noumenal, as this is not possible, but rather at –among other things
– the kind of aesthetic composition of the urban ecological whole that would encourage a respect for
its being nonetheless there as well as an aesthetic composition of the urban ecological whole that
is itself premised upon and reflects a respect for its being nevertheless there, present amongst the
newly conceived commons, not sequestered by normative necessity out of the most salient parts of
‘our’ experience in the built environment, as it is equally well ‘theirs,’ insofar as, like Feurstein (though
perhaps less idiosyncratically), we ought not to effect a dissociation between the two.
The specific ideological forms which are made manifest in the contemporary urban landscape
by the authorial/authoritarian edict of that tin-pot despotic figure of ‘the architect’ are not arbitrary,
however. Foucault writes that “in the classical period, the melancholy of the English was easily
explained by the instability of the weather; all those fine droplets of water that penetrated the channels and fibers of the human body and made it lose its firmness, predisposed it to madness. Finally,
neglecting an immense literature that stretches from Ophelia to the Lorelei, let us note only the great
half-anthropological, half-cosmological analyses of Heinroth, which interpret madness as the manifestation in man of an obscure and aquatic element, a dark disorder, a moving chaos, the seed and
death of all things, which opposes the mind’s luminous and adult stability.”88 That is, he implicitly
but strategically opposes one form of madness to another, the first, aquatic, schizic, connective and
yet sprawling in a manner that is ostensibly terrifying, or at least ideologically constituted to be so,
and anathema to the second madness, that is, terrestrial madness, paranoiac, striating, structuring,
amenable to a dependence upon and deployment of ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ by a masterful and,
one might venture to say, Kantian subject. The topology of urban water distribution networks is the
point at which these competing madnesses meet; the point “where the sea becomes land, the land
sea, where the city is designated only by ‘marine terms’ and the water by ‘urban terms.’”89 And it will
neither do, therefore, to conceive of delineations like the wall before the third space as the hyperorganized spectacular screen that merely obscures ‘the real’ from us, nor will it do to conceive of the
third space as part of our daily phenomenal life, because it isn’t. A properly liminal understanding of
the third space, one that understands and interprets it as inseparable from the intractably networked
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arrangements which characterize the urban landscape as a whole, would need to resist such a onedimensional interpretation of the mediation between the phenomenal and the noumenal – or more
accurately between the phenomenal and the possibility of the noumenal. As Kaika writes:
“Natural elements are not in fact kept altogether outside the modern
home; but rather are selectively allowed to enter after having undergone
significant material and social transformations, through being produced,
purified, and commodified. Polluted air and recycled water, for example,
have to undergo a complex chemical and social process of purification
before they are allowed to enter the domestic sphere of consumption.
In fact, the more human activities transform nature, the more the intervention of technology (water purifiers, air conditioning, ionizers, etc.)
becomes necessary in order to cancel the effects of this transformation
and render nature ‘good’ again before it is allowed to enter the private
home in the form of a commodity. Thus, although excluded ideologically,
natural processes (just like social processes) remain connected materially to the inside of the home, constituting an integral part of its material
production and smooth function.”90
Or rather, it is not only that the third space mediates our ideologically prescribed phenomenal construction of inside/outside in the manner of that which draws the otherwise abject away from our
sight into some indeterminate netherworld, but mediates it also in the manner of what which produces from that indeterminate netherworld, as though by magic, all the material creature comforts
that are today expected of even the most basic of architectural constructs. It is not that the ideological constructs of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ obstructs us from the noumenal, but rather that it obstructs us
from the possibility of appreciating that the noumenal exists, autonomously, out there. Acquiescence
to the spectacular fiction of a ‘purely inside space’ or a ‘purely outside space’ obstructs us from an
appreciation that things really exist, that they aren’t simply the playthings of a kind of diffuse human solipsism. After all, as Žižek writes, “it is Kant who, insofar as he conceives the gap as merely
epistemological, continues to presuppose a fully constituted noumenal realm existing out there”91
so it’s not that architectural constructs, conceived as and built from the conception of discreet and
self-contained units of an environment, actually connect to an indeterminate netherworld, the realm
of the otherwise disavowed noumenal, so much as they engender this perception, they engender an
agnosticism towards the ontological autonomy of the means by which materials like water nonetheless appear when we turn the tap in our bathrooms, our kitchens, our public pools – in spite of their
having been figured as unavailable to us in anything other than a phenomenal way. As Jacques
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Ellul writes, “we are incapable of knowing that this miracle is a long social process of production,”92
though we are equally well incapable of knowing that this ‘incapable of knowing’ is itself a long
social process of production. That is, the perceived intransience of the kinds of architectural forms
which obscure ‘the third space’ – implying the sets of relations that undermine the separation between the first space and the second – bespeaks the very ontological quagmire which produces it, a
kind of acquired xenophobia towards the real.
The aesthetic construction of the third space as absent functions in such a manner as to
deny the connectedness of architectural constructs to the environments that they otherwise exist
within and which otherwise sustain them, it ideologically denies what Katherine Hayles calls ‘interactivity’ and ‘positionality’ which are necessary, she argues, if one aims to surpass such agnosticism.
“Interactivity points towards our connection with the world: everything we know about the world we
know because we interact with it. Positionality refers to our locations as humans living in certain
times, cultures, and historical traditions: we interact with the world not from a disembodied, generalized framework but from positions marked by the peculiarities of our circumstances as embodied
human creatures,” Hayles writes, “together, interactivity and positionality pose a strong challenge
to objectivity, which for our purposes can be defined as the belief that we know reality because we
are separated from it. What happens if we begin from the opposite premise, that we know the world
because we are connected to it?”93 Truly, if we were to comport ourselves towards the third space –
as the kind of space which subverts the delineation of the spaces – in such a way as to appreciate
the extent to which we are deprived of an experiential and coenesthetic engagement with it by the
‘nature’ of contemporary urban architectural constructs, would we begin to see some of the more
egregious abuses of the ecological whole, whether to erstwhile considered humans or nonhumans,
as symptomatic thereof?
Žižek calls the relation of interactivity and positionality – our condemnation of ‘architecture’
notwithstanding – the architectural parallax, that is, “the building, in its very material existence, bears
the imprint of different and mutally exclusive perspectives.”94 True, though the fact remains that the
preponderance of architectural parallax are ideologically constituted in such a manner as to leave
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one believing those irreconcilable orientations to be amenable to one another – simply in virtue of
their having been conceived of architecturally, that is, by a discipline which is itself ideologically
constituted as isolate and distinct – leaving the indelible mark of the uncanny on the environs they
pertain to insofar as this is merely a mask upon the real heterogenous makeup of the environment’s
relations to its multifarious inhabitants.
That said, the converse, it must be said, is equally true – that is, it’s hard to deny the ontological autonomy of the material, and the social and productive relations that bring water to one’s tap,
if you can light the water that emerges on fire. This is indeed the case for the residents depicted in
Josh Fox’s documentary Gasland – about the unintended toxic consequences of the hydraulic extraction of natural gas, otherwise known as Fracking – but the specific architectural constitution of
our relations in the urban environment, by contrast, is more often than not particularly suited to the
de-emphasis and denial of any such material, any such social and productive relations, and any such
ideological constitution, and as a result more often than not suited to the denial of, or at least psychological abstraction from, any such problematic or unsustainable formations within the urban ecological whole. As Harman writes:
“Inspecting a length of unbroken pipeline, we do not merge into mystic
union with its secluded function: we already rise above the contexture
and see it as a pipeline rather than as something else. . . the broken
tool counts as the first way in which the entity is freed from its contexture, released from the dimension of reference. Here, the tool is encountered as a tool rather than only quietly functioning as one. Fractured equipment emerges as a determinate entity, torn loose from the
totality; to this extent, it attains a kind of presence in spite of the system
that tries to consume it.”95
That is, it is unfortunately, more often than not, only when the provisional and contingent ‘nature’ of
architectural constructs assert themselves, in the form of accident and breakdown, that one is forced
to appreciate the extant reality of the third space, the relations that mediate and allow for the spectacular separation of first space, ‘inside,’ from second, ‘outside.’ Wanton abuses to ‘outside’ are therefore
sanctioned by a spectacular logic, one which commodifies all things as proper to the implicit figuration
of ‘inside,’ in spite of their having been ideologically constructed as distinct in the first place.
Indeed all current political platitudes to the ‘unsustainable’ biases of the metropolis with
respect to environmental or ecological degradation are contoured in such a manner as to alleviate
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calls for fundamental reform or overhauls to the function of the urban totality. They are structured
and intended to placate or mollify any conceptual ecology, like Unitary Urbanism, that would demand
as much, while nevertheless giving the appearance of earnest care and concern therein. One can
plainly perceive the sleight if only one takes the time to compare the spectacular public-relations
campaigns wrought by, variously, political parties, oil and gas corporations, agricultural concerns and
the like to the near unanimous but often muffled and suppressed articulations of their impact by the
scientific community. As Debord writes:
The masters of society are now obliged to speak of pollution and to
combat it (because, after all, they live on the same planet as we do, and
this is the only sense in which one can allow that capitalism’s development has actually realized a certain fusion of the classes) so as to
dissimulate it: because the simple truth of the ‘harmful effects’ and current risks suffice to constitute an immense factor in revolt, a materialist
demand of the exploited, as vital as the struggle of the proletarians of
the 19th Century for the possibility of eating.96
This dissimulation, for our purposes, takes the form of the hermetic discipline of architecture, which
composes structures which will engender in their inhabitants a continued, and continuing, amenability
to such dissimulation, a perpetual cognitive dissonance to “these two [mutually] antagonistic movements – the supreme stage of commodity production and the project of its total negation, equally rich
in internal contradictions. . . the two sides through which a single historical moment (long-awaited
and often foreseen in inadequate partial figures) manifests itself: the impossibility of the continuation
of the functioning of capitalism.”97 Point source metropolitan pollution is important in its own right but
is ultimately systematic of what Rancière has recently called one ‘distribution of the sensible’ in which
the epistemic parameters of the built environment “causes reality to appear as [either] transformable
or inalterable.”98 Why do we not aesthetically involve and engage with the interminable symbiosis of
the third space? Is this space the purview and purchase of the schizic-aquatic modality of madness
in and of itself, with the hermetic enclosed architectural construct the purview and purchase of the
paranoiac-terrestrial modality of madness in and of itself, or are these connections and allegiances
themselves merely ideological edicts to fear one and rely upon the other? “The denunciation of mere
appearance effortlessly moves within mere appearance, because it has no other way of designating what is proper – that is, nonappearance – except as the obscure opposite of the spectacle,” as
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Nancy writes, “since the spectacle occupies all of space, its opposite can only make itself known as
the inappropriable secret of an originary property hidden beneath appearances.”99 The construction
of the third space as absent passes as implicit, originary, intransient – just ‘the way it is’ – while nonetheless serving definitive and easily articulated ideological ends of spectacular society. The spectacular fiction of an ontological privilege of ‘the human’ as separate from, above and beyond the inert
environment we otherwise inhabit, is mirrored in the spectacular fiction of the architectural construct
as separate from, above and beyond the inert ‘nature’ that we have otherwise opposed it to.
The locus of concern is not the ideological resonance of wall or floor, however – ideologically
resonant as they might be – as to inter these forms as themselves coextensive with, qua material,
the constructive aesthetic banishment of logistical water networks from the contemporary metropolis
would reduce what, in a more pressing sense, pervades the entirety of the third space, which is itself
– as already stated – interminable. Just as there is no philosophically legitimate basis for demarcating a pure architectural ‘inside’ from its concomitant pure architectural ‘outside’ there is equally well
no philosophically legitimate basis for demarcating the point at which one particular architectural construct ceases to be networked at distance or coterminous with another, whether by degree or by kind.
Even the delimitation of the urban or the metropolitan is merely a convenient shorthand for a more
or less intensive density of connections within a meshwork of social and productive relations that
comprise what we colloquially call ‘the city.’ That is, “continually drawing near the wall, while at the
same time pushing the wall further away,”100 we are beholden to the belief that our environs are selfcontained and self-sustaining units of discreet living or work space, while at the same time we are
beholden to the belief that – again, to the limited degree they are acknowledged whatsoever – the
productive relations that operate within ‘the third space’ are themselves self-contained and discreet
units, as in the case of Žižek’s articulation. Neither is true. As Kaika writes:
The social construction of the Western (bourgeois) home as an autonomous, independent, private space is predicated upon a process of visual and discursive exclusion of undesired social (anomie, homelessness,
social conflict, etc.) and natural (cold, dirt, pollution, etc.) elements,”
101
“high modernity with its crusade towards rationalization and clarity
created a city of rhizomatic underground networks, which ceaselessly
transform nature into city. The burial of networks was so successful that
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many of them are today undecipherable. The ideal city, the new utopia,
was clean and sanitized, both in visual and literary terms. Water, for
example, as Latour and Le Bourhis note, has become truly invisible, or
has been turned systematically into something self-evident, an apparent
triviality, located simply at the mouth of the tap. This ‘silencing’ of water
and other networked relations rendered it into what it is not – H2O. The
new urban fetish, then, lay, amongst others, in the apparent aesthetic
disconnection from all old, dirty, unsafe, and ugly networks. . . The
mess, the dirt, the underbelly of the city became invisible both socially
and environmentally, banned from everyday consciousness.102
To be sure ‘silencing’ is an appropriate turn of phrase, and is not deployed here arbitrarily – it is rather only when we realise that materials like water have been architecturally stymied and left as what
Rancière terms ‘the part which has no part’ that we might begin to challenge the systematic reduction
of station and place conferred onto successive disciplines, like architecture, in the construction of the
urban world and everyday life. How else would one challenge the pervasive and essentially unchallenged illusion that one’s home or place of work is autonomous and distinct from both other ‘autonomous and distinct’ homes and places of work, as well as the contrived delineation of ‘nature’ from
‘social,’ other than by “the extention of the collective [that] makes possible a presentation of humans
and nonhumans that is completely different from the one required by the cold war between objects
and subjects. . . The collective is indeed composed of entities sharing enough essential features to
participate in a Political Ecology that will never again oblige them to become, without debate, either
objects belonging to nature or subjects belonging to society.”103 Indeed as Nancy writes:
Both the theory and praxis of critique demonstrate that, from now on,
critique absolutely needs to rest on some principle other than that
of the ontology of the Other and the Same: it needs an ontology of
being-with-one-another, and this ontology must support both the sphere
of ‘nature’ and sphere of ‘history,’ as well as both the ‘human’ and
the ‘nonhuman’ ; it must be an ontology for the world, for everyone –
and if I can be so bold, it has to be an ontology for each and everyone
and for the world ‘as a totality,’ and nothing short of the whole world,
since this is all there is (but, in this way, there is all).104
Or rather, it is not enough to simply produce spaces which intuit the demands of a future collective,
but rather it is the case that one must work actively to bring about that future commons and then
develop spaces appropriate to such a commons to accommodate. This is not possible under the
spectacular regime of isolate and hermetic disciplines like architecture and politics with their delim-
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ited and particular purview, but is possible under the regime of Unitary Urbanism insofar as it neither
subscribes to nor is beholden to any such delimited or particular purview; the concerns of building the
city for the situationist practice of Unitary Urbanism are the concerns of creative and holistic composition, whether of the commons itself or the experience of everyday life.
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Chapter Three
Against Politics: Ontological Urbanism II

The urban ecology of the contemporary city remains in a state
of flux and awaits a new kind of environmental politics that can
respond to the co-evolutionary dynamics of social and bio-physical systems without resorting to the reactionary discourses of the
past. By moving away from the idea of the city as the antithesis of
an imagined bucolic ideal we can begin to explore the production of urban space as a synthesis between nature and culture in
which long-standing ideological antinomies lose their analytical
utility and political resonance.
– Matthew Gandy
Rivers were the primal highways of life. From the crack of time,
they had borne men’s dreams, and in their lovely rush to elsewhere, fed our wanderlust, mimicked our arteries, and charmed
our imaginations in a way the static pond or vast and savage
ocean never could. Rivers had transported entire cultures, absorbed the tears of vanquished races, and propelled those foams
that would impregnate future realms. Everywhere dammed and
defiled, they cast modern man’s witless reflection back at him and went on singing the world’s inexhaustible song.
– Tom Robbins
Our working hypotheses will be reconsidered at each future upheaval, wherever it may come from.
– Guy Debord

Hydro-social distributional networks do not develop in isolation but are both conceived of and
constructed in concert with a myriad of different elements in and around the urban assemblage
contributing to their particular form and function. In what follows we would like to show how such
hydro-social arrangements and figurations are inherently political and that whether or not materials
like water are conceived of as ontologically autonomous, existent outside of a correlationist epistemology, determines both the purchase and commensurability of extant political forms as well as our
relative capacity to conceive of alternatives. It is not enough to show that any political act or gesture
inherent to Unitary Urbanism must be opposed to an ontological privileging of the human. Rather,
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any such act or gesture must be opposed to politics itself in the form it takes on under the sign and
aegis of spectacular global capital. That is, Unitary Urbanism ought to be opposed to politics when
conceived as a hermetic endeavour unto itself, when isolated from the material realities of everyday
life in the cityscape – and opposed also to the specific political forms which represent both such an
ontological privileging and such spectacular sequestration, the most dominant of which today is the
political form of neoliberalism.
Certainly fascism represents such a point of convergence, wherein an ontological debasement of ‘the other’ meets a delimited politics that legislates over other discourses rather than includes them in its constitutive whole, but neoliberalism is so particularly dangerous because when
taken at face value, it otherwise appears to be – and certainly purports to be – an ideology of emancipation and freedom, but the basis of this purported emancipation and these purported freedoms is
nonetheless a more clandestine and obscurant kind of totalisation, rooted in a wholesale subservience to the means and measures of neoliberalism itself. As Harvey writes, “neoliberalism has, in
short, become hegemonic. . . it has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has
become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand
the world.”105 In other words, as Michael Gardiner writes, it represents “not simply a neutral belief
system; [but rather] is inscribed within the matrix of social activities that structure our relationship to
the world and helps to generate a particular knowledge of it.”106 Neoliberalism is therefore at once
the dominant ideology that obtains today and also the particular epistemic condition that allows for
its continued existence as ideology through alienated commodity relations. Though, in what follows,
we will call the former ‘neoliberal ideology’ and the latter ‘spectacular global capital.’ Neoliberalism
today is an ideology that insists upon and constructs the edifices of not only the particular form of
the means of production but the particular form of the means of consumption. Or rather, commodity
relation that obtains amongst the universally alienated constituents of the urban environment is the
spectacular form of consumption sanctioned by neoliberal ideology – as though you’d selected your
means of knowing the world from the choiceless choices of a supermarket isle. The way that water
is today appropriated by and run through the metropolitan assemblage by neoliberal ideology is,
by design, conveniently interpretable by the episteme of spectacular global capital and at the same
time serves to produce not the condition of well-being for those who constitute that metropolitan
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assemblage but the condition of their docile unquestioning ignorance, in the case of the neoliberal
subject, and their political and aesthetic disenfranchisement, in the case of those actors and assemblages irreconcilable to the ends of neoliberal ideology; actors and assemblages those surrounding water and water distribution networks, whose recognition and demands do not accord with the
smooth façade of spectacular global capital.
As such, for the same reasons by which we cannot accept ‘architecture’ and ‘the architecture
of urban landscapes’ as it is most frequently conceptualized – that is, as hermetic disciplines abstracted from the connective tissue of everyday life in cities – we can neither accept politics when it
takes on a similarly rigid, structural, compartmentalized and segmented form. A merely architectural
architecture is hylomorphic in that it misses or obscures the artistic and poetic aspects of the technical and social assemblages of urban water distribution. A merely political politics is hylomorphic in
that it misses or actively negates the political resonances of everyday life. So in the same way that
‘Unitary Ubranism’ ought to supplant the idealist and hylomorphic pretentions of the practitioners of a
merely architectural architecture, it equally well ought to supplant the idealist and hylomorphic pretentions of a merely political politics – and do so in the same gesture – as an alternative in in which
the technical and social assemblages of urban water distribution actually have a profoundly vested
stake, in spite of their ideological and, in turn, epistemic suppression.
In much the same way that Unitary Urbanism anticipates the questioning of the ontological
station of the arrangements of all the things that constitute the landscape of the city – a questioning
inherent to Speculative Realism, New Materialisms, Object Oriented Ontology, Onticology and the
like – it also anticipates the need to question the systems by which these ‘things,’ of which we are
one, and merely one kind among many, are governed. To be sure, the revolutionary spirit of the situationists is not lost upon the political figurations of a renewed comportment towards the ontological
station of water as is imbricated within the fabric of the contemporary western metropolis. It is in this
sense, then, that there are indeed deep sympathies between Unitary Urbanism and Political Ecology, insofar as the inclination to include erstwhile excluded components of the technical and social
assemblages of the city ought not be reconciled into the political order that obtains today. Indeed
such adaptation would be, and is inevitably, recuperated into the logics of the spectacular edifices
of global capital, the perestroika of material reality – but rather ought to express itself as a radically
critical position towards such extant political orders, with an eye to their being wholly supplanted by
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political forms which acknowledge and respect the rhizomatically networked and irreducible composite of the cities they transpire within.
The problem is at once political and ontological, which is to say that – while erstwhile considered humans and nonhumans interact within networks of their own co-determination and composition in deeply asymmetrical ways – there are nonetheless stakes for extant and contemporary
political forms in whether or not the materials of everyday life are metabolised in an aesthetic form
which speaks to their earnest ontological standing. To be sure, the Left, in spite of its manifold ossified forms, ought to be interested in holistic compositional gestures which account for techno-social
assemblages specifically in their composition of both erstwhile considered human and nonhuman actors. Indeed the Left ought to be interested and invested in such gestures and practices because the
neoliberal figurations held by the arbiters of spectacular global capital are, most assuredly, interested
and invested in a merely political politics which ontologically accounts for only a very select set – not
even ‘humans’ but at best ‘citizens,’ neoliberal subjects in the base determination of their fiscal registration and administration in the workings of the state, if even that. As Neil Smith writes:
The ideology of separate and distinct social and natural spheres therefore begs the question: for what purpose? What social work does this
dualism do? There are many layers to an answer, but most simply,
the positing of an external nature rationalizes and justifies the unprecedented exploitation of nature (humans cum non-humans), the ‘massive
racket’ that capitalism, historically and geographically, represents.107
In other words, then, the inauguration of a revolutionary politics of ontological inclusiveness doesn’t
simply necessitate convincing the people who have never considered our ontological station in any
depth. No, rather it implies this, but moreover, and unfortunately so, dealing with those who actually
have considered ontological station – that is, dealing with ardent humanists, legion within the contemporary neoliberal discourse – those to whom the ontological privilege of the human is axiomatic;
those who not only aren’t interested in novel political arrangements, ones which would accommodate
the non-human, but are indeed militantly opposed to them.
The extent to which water is ‘privatized’ is an important area of research, though ‘privatization’
as such is neither coextensive with water as it exists, or ‘serves,’ within contemporary political and
aesthetic arrangements (in both cases as absent), nor is it the primary focus of the current work. And
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while some cities may be particularly egregious in their exclusionary political practices regarding water
use/distribution/conservation – Mumbai108, Durban109, Ghana110 and the like – and others may be lauded for their commitment to normative conceptions of ‘sustainability,’ that is, lauded for their in relative
terms ‘better’ prospects for the maintenance of those forms that obtain – Seattle111, Toronto112, Austin113
– no municipal politics is today conducted under the preconditions of the kind of ontological respect
that is being described here. What is at issue, then, is not so much whether water is provided equitably to the members of an existing commons, a goal that in and of itself is far from realized in a great
many instances with over one billion people lacking access to clean potable water at last UN estimation – but rather how water is interred within such extant political and aesthetic arrangements. That is,
even liberal democratic arrangements of metropolitan water distribution, by and large, posit the water
that is being distributed as an ostensibly apriori ‘service’ or ‘resource’ while nonetheless obscuring the
development of these ‘services’ and ‘resources’ as such, recasting them as intransient and without
origin. That is, “the urban environment becomes naturalized, as if it were created smoothly and miraculously, as if it had been there, distinct and separate from natural and social processes”114 all along,
as Kaika writes. Indeed as she describes the distribution arrangement of Athens in the early 1990s,
“the scarce character of water and the increase in its exchange value was attributed to the ‘natural’
character of the resource, rather than to the actual institutional, economic and social organization of
a produced commodity. While the ‘natural = scarce’ equation was invoked in order to create public
consensus around increasing water prices, the very process that actually makes water a commodity—
that is, its production process—was suppressed.”115 Indeed the same is true of cities with more ostensibly equitable political relations, which is to say that even when ‘water resources’ are not ideologically
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contoured and presented as ‘scarce’ they are nevertheless, and almost ubiquitously so, ideologically
contoured and presented as ‘service’ or ‘resource.’ In other words, while some metropolitan arrangements may be more functionally neoliberal than others, their politics must be nonetheless subjected to
critique insofar as they all conform to the implicitly neoliberal axiom of water as instrumentally ‘for us’
rather than ‘in itself.’ And while it should be noted that treating water itself with such blatant disrespect
for its ontological autonomy does little disservice to it in isolation, the consequences to other unrecognized assemblages that depend on that water have been oftentimes harrowing.
This essentially characterizes the spectacular nature of urban water distribution, in that the
existent social assemblage responsible for the ‘management’ of water mirrors the existent social assemblage responsible for the ‘management’ of the society of the spectacle. As Swyngedouw put it:
To the extent that there is indeed a close relationship between hydrosocial ordering and political economic configurations or, in other words,
between the ‘nature of society’ and the ‘nature of its water flows,’ every
hydro-social project reflects a particular type of socio-environmental
organization. Imagining different, more inclusive, sustainable and equitable forms of hydro-social organization implies imagining different and
more effective, assumingly democratic, forms of social organization.”116
Water itself, and the networks of human and nonhuman actors that comprise the techno-social assembalges of water distribution in cities, are therefore politically absent and lacking representation,
to the effect that they are excluded on the basis that they do not participate in the same way that
discernably ‘rational’ human actors participate. And moreover all the ways that such techno-social assemblages do participate are essentially ignored or knowingly suppressed, insofar as they challenge
the fundamentally undemocratic basis of spectacular global capital and neoliberal political forms (in
spite of their shallow and contingent claim to the western, merely humanist, cosmopolitan determination of democratic). As Levi Bryant writes, “for the neoliberal, the only units that compose social
assemblages are individual persons and the mechanism by which social assemblages are formed
arises through them pursuing their own rational self-interest. If a person fails to find success in the
world, then this is because they are lazy, lacking in initiative, or because they have failed to properly
exercise their will.”117 In other words, we ought not be surprised that the hydro-social projects particular to neoliberal politics are ontologically exclusionary, and more often than not ontically exclusionary,
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they are indeed, to a more or less degree, consciously designed to be just so.
Indeed when Roger Keil and Julie-Anne Boudreau write that “the tremendous successes of
more progressive environmental policies are now running up against the material and discursive
limits of reform”118 – this is precisely what is meant, that in the absence of an alternative conception
of our ontological standing with respect to the erstwhile considered human and nonhuman actors
which populate the assemblages of the city, any efforts to curb the more virulent inclinations of global
capital have taken on, and will continue to take on, a form which is reconcilable with and available to
recuperation by neoliberal ideology. As Neil Smith writes, “even environmentalist insiders now admit
what socialists, radicals and anarchists have long concluded, namely that the mainstream environmental movement is dead, co-opted by the very capitalist power it once tried to fight, reincarnated
as little more than green capitalism.”119 This is because the contemporary environmental movement
is either premised upon the still inherently humanist conception of ‘sustainability’ – that is, sustainable ‘for us’ – or a deep ecology model of a delineable ‘nature’ which must be maintained in some
austere/puritanical form. The former is faulty in its adherence to an ontological commitment which
excludes delineable actors from participating in the commons – i.e. nonhumans and networks of erstwhile considered humans and nonhumans – and the latter is untenable in its own ontological commitment which excludes delineable actors from participating in various arrangement of what is otherwise
called nature, of which they are most certainly a part, i.e. us, the functional category or set of what
have been otherwise defined in various ways as human actors. Both, in their own way, reinscribe the
illegitimate dualisms of nature on the one side and society on the other as proffered by the spectacular ideological form and composition of global neoliberal politics.
We ought to resist this first because we should aspire to a politics of inclusion which accounts
for all the actors which comprise the material reality of everyday life in the urban ecological whole,
which is why Levi-Bryant notes that “things that are often seen as apolitical are, in fact, sites of the
political: information technologies, water resources, oceans and their fisheries, algae blooms, how
we raise animals, ecosystems, the presence and absence of roads, plumbing, etc[. . .] these things
exert power over us, contributing to oppressive relations in particular ways[. . .] they are issues for all
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of us.”120 Though second, and equally well, because a stable determinative category or set of human
actors is actually itself, by and large, an essentialist construct of the enlightenment pretensions neoliberal ideology. As Dimitris Papadopolous writes:
We have indeed never been human; but we have never been human
not because we have never been modern but because ‘we’ have never
been we and ‘they’ (the nonhumans) have never been they. The postanthropocentric dimension of posthumanist left politics is neither about
developing an ecological egalitarianism that considers the value of
all nonhuman beings as equal, nor about creating the grounds for the
articulation of constantly novel connections and concerns between us
and them. . . it is about making alliances and engaging in practices that
restore justice in the immediate ecologies which certain humans and
certain nonhumans are inhabiting in deeply asymmetrical ways.121
So it is not simply that we ought to, in a saliently political though not merely political respect, recognize the ontological autonomy of the material that comprises everyday material life in the metropolis,
like water distribution networks, and oppose their politics to ours in the same but nontheless bicameral legislative house, but rather realise that, asymmetrical as we might be, the politics of urban
composition is in fact a politics proper to us all in the same sense.
This is to say that a politics contoured by an alternative conception of ontology, one which
affirms “the existence and dignity of a reality independent of our own,”122 as Karl Schroeder writes,
must not simply challenge our objectification of the world around us, but must moreover challenge
our allegiance to a normative understanding of the subject, and must imply a radical requestioning of
how such a determination and naming, or interpolation, of the human subject is itself produced by the
edifices of spectacular neoliberal ideology. As Robyn Ekersley writes:
Whatever faculty we choose to underscore our own uniqueness or specialness as the basis of our moral superiority (e.g. rationality, language,
or our tool making capability) we will inevitably find that either there
are some humans who do not possess such a faculty or that there are
some non-humans who do. Nonanthropocentric ethical theorists have
used this absence of any rigid, absolute dividing line between humans
and nonhumans to point out the logical inconsistency of conventional
anthropocentric ethical and political theory that purports to justify the
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exclusive moral considerability of humans on the basis of our separateness from, say, the rest of the animal world.”123
The examples of delineable actors in the world not meeting the neoliberally determined threshold for
inclusion within neoliberalist politics’ own legislative frameworks ‘as human,’ and therefore being excluded from their account within these frameworks, are legion – wherein even cosmopolitan humanism has therefore failed repeatedly check and reign in its neoliberal origins and to even be otherwise
humanist in its predilection for definite and systematic categorization, for inclusion and exclusion. As
Žižek writes in the Parallax View:
It is precisely when a human being is deprived of his particular sociopolitical identity, the basis of his specific citizenship, that he, in one
and the same move, is no longer recognized and/or treated as human.
In short, the paradox is that one is deprived of human rights precisely
when one is in effect, in one’s social reality, reduced to a human being
‘in general,’ without citizenship, profession, and so on – that is to say,
precisely when one in effect becomes the ideal bearer of ‘universal human rights’ (which belong to me ‘independently of’ my profession, sex,
citizenship, religion, ethnic identity. . .)”124
Though when one is indeed the ‘ideal bearer of universal human rights’ is precisely when one is lost
to account by neoliberal ideology, included only as “the count of the uncounted – or the part of those
who have no part”125 in Rancière’s terms. In a move akin to Donna Harraway’s articulations of cyborg
ontology, then, we may be well served to foster political forms which neither exclude others based
on their lacking some particular constitution, nor delimit ourselves to political forms which include us
only on the basis of ours. This inclination, however, is not shared by all new materialists and political
ecologists, and there are those who have voiced concerns, and justifiably so, with the implications of
a politics derived from what has become known in these conceptual circles as ‘flat ontology.’
While the exclusion of nonhuman actors and networks is de rigueur for neoliberal ideology
– insofar as, again, there is a vested interest in the particular composition of things like hydro-social
distribution networks being derived from a totalizing ontological hierarchy, the politics of which account for merely the neoliberal subject and the plutocrats who they more or less obey, considered
mostly in an enlightened false consciousness way, if at all – there also those on the left who do
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not subscribe to such a totalizing ontological divestment of the nonhuman but nonetheless want to
maintain some sort of humanistic primacy. Speculative realist Graham Harman, for as useful as he
may be in his philosophical defense of the ontological autonomy of the erstwhile considered ‘objects’
which populate everyday life, is otherwise useless in terms formulating ways of composing the social
commons, having thoroughly divorced himself from such considerations. Indeed, Nick Srnicek, coeditor of the Speculative Turn volume is decidedly no better, egregiously concluding that because the
cosmos seems indifferent to ‘politics’ that normative positions cannot be derived themselves from a
materialist ontology. Digital ecologist Alexander Galloway, moreover, writes of such new materialisms
and political ecologies that they fall prey to “a kind of ‘Citizens United fallacy’” wherein “everything
is an object, and thus Monsanto and Exxon Mobil are objects on equal footing just like the rest. Like
other (human) objects, Monsanto is free to make unlimited campaign donations, contribute to the
degradation of the environment, etc.”126 He continues:
Despite their protestations OOO [Object Oriented Ontology] still doesn’t
have a reliable way to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects. In
other words OOO doesn’t make much room for a theory of judgment,
since it’s busy kneecapping the human. And this is why we’ve seen that
OOO can’t seem to produce the two things that philosophy has always
grounded in a theory of judgment: an aesthetics and a politics.127
Here, then, he concludes that flat ontologies are not necessarily wrong, by his account, but are in
and of themselves dangerous, insofar as “they can be so easily co-opted by power” and that “the
most successful flat ontologies are the ones that fortify their flatness with some newfound political
dynamic.”128 To be sure I couldn’t agree more! But what Galloway has failed to realise – and what
Harman and Srnicek have, in essence, foreclosed upon entirely – is that such new political dynamics
are simply not possible in the absence of such alternative ontologies, flat ontology being one such
conception, and that, in their absence, political forms will inevitably tend towards the neoliberal ideal
of spectacular society, i.e. the political and aesthetic exclusion functionally of all those actors who do
not or cannot conform to the specific relations of domination which obtain within the pedantic stratifications of a purportedly humanist cosmopolitan politics. Water, can’t live with it, can’t live without it,
so they bury it beneath the pavement and only haul it out like a circus geek to show how needlessly
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and grotesquely rich they are or to clean up their figurative and literal shit.
That said, again, ontology does not dictate any one political form, it cannot and indeed ought
not to, insofar as there points, most especially in the urban environment, where erstwhile considered
‘inert’ materials like water enter and are engaged in the political and infrastructural assemblages with
other delineable actors (erstwhile considered humans and other non-humans, to use such strategic
essentialisms) more, and points where they engage in such political and infrastructural assemblages
less, where their engagement is latent, registered only in the scientific sense of their being ‘out there’
circulating in the broader ecological commons – though in both cases remaining essentially indifferent to what particular forms such political and infrastructural assemblages might take. As Levi Bryant points out, an ontology cannot posit one or another political form but can rather “exclude certain
political claims based on the thesis that they are simply mistaken ontologically,”129 and such claims –
that is, ontologically incorrect ones – most assuredly saturate spectacular neoliberal capital. As David
Rylance writes:
Political agnosticism is nice and, again, this is not to say ontological
fact is predicated on political truths—that I accept—but, beyond that,
SR’s [Speculative Realism’s] contention that not only should we ‘probably maybe ought to’ but rather must be interested in the autonomy of
ontological fact is certainly an ethical and political matter. The break
with anti-realism—the urgency of this—is not based on whatever really
composes ontology—which has done fine and will do fine without our
sudden fascination with it. Such fascination then is grounded in an ethical edict—with political consequences.130
In other words, it does not behove us ontologically to rework and reconsider our politics but rather it
behoves us politically to revolutionize our ontology. As Ian Bogost writes, “the consequence of realism is that the world isn’t particularly concerned with us. As such, it’s wrong to construe realism as
an imperative in the first place. Rather, it must be cast as an invitation: if things exist in multitudes,
then perhaps it might be interesting and productive to consider them.”131 Indeed the question of what
political forms are most commensurable with new materialism, speculative realism, onticology, object
oriented ontology and the like is not merely one aimed at the inclusion of those actors who have
been excluded by the auspices of global neoliberal capital, but moreover aimed at the new political
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forms and dynamics that are made available to us by such radically democratic inclusion.
This is not the same as saying we ought to respect the ontological autonomy of water because it is ultimately in our interests to do so – because it entails exploring political arrangements
which happen to be and produce arrangements that are more socially equitable – but rather that we
ought to respect the ontological autonomy of water because the ontological exclusion of materials
whether organic or inorganic is philosophically untenable, and also – that is, in addition – that we
would be better off than we are now; that in doing so we avail ourselves of new political dynamics for,
as per Galloway’s concern, the practices and procedures of judgement. Indeed the material forms
of Monsanto and Haliburton are as real as you or I – as is water and the techno-social assemblages
and distribution networks that surround it – but this doesn’t mean that these components of the
cosmological whole are somehow excused from the communitarian munus or obligation towards the
commons, nor from the expectation that they contribute meaningfully to the collective well-being of
that commons, nor from the imperative that they not unilaterally harm other actors and assemblages
in the full ecological commons.
“Measurements taken above the Antarctic are not good this year. Rare species that naturalists would like to protect are being carried off in smoke,” as Bruno Latour writes, “the innocent chlorfluorocarbons of Monsanto’s assembly lines turned out to be a crime against the ecosphere.”132 To be
sure, while the crimes of human assemblages of the commons are all too, well, common, so too are
the crimes of non-human actors and their assemblages. With it noted that many of these crimes are
demonstrably provoked by the development and maintenance of human society, things like tsunamis
or the forests of British Columbia’s having been infested with pine beetles, do little to advance just
and equitable relations between erstwhile considered humans and nonhumans. Such commons must
be able to arbitrate between these assemblages and networks and mitigate what, at least in effect,
amounts to vigilante justice. In addition to having rejected it on the grounds that it maintains a false
dichotomy, of essentialized nature on the one hand and essentialized humanity on the other, this
then is another reason why one ought not subscribe to deep ecological or environmentalist ontological commitments – altruistic though they may be – insofar as such a commons, in the practice and
processes of such arbitration, will nonetheless be often called upon to intervene in and continuously
rework the assemblages and relations between assemblages that exist and transpire. As Swynge-
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douw writes, “interventions in the organization of the hydrological cycle are always political in character and therefore contested and contestable.”133 Mute though it may be, it nonetheless costs and
taxes water itself nothing to be brought into metropolitan social assemblages, though the manner in
which this transpires today costs and taxes upon other assemblages of erstwhile considered human
and nonhuman actors, whether inside or outside the delineated purview of ‘the city,’ greatly – and in
this sense simply scaling down such interventions is neither the point nor particularly desirable. Félix
Guattari writes that:
. . .increasingly reliant upon human intervention, and a time will come
when vast programmes will need to be set up in order to regulate the
relationship between oxygen, ozone and carbon dioxide in the Earth’s
atmosphere. . . . In the future, much more than simple defense of nature
will be required; we will have to launch an initiative if we are to repair
the Amazonian ‘lung,’ for example.134
And he is indeed all too correct, which is why a retreat into dogmatic luddism under the pretense of
a respect for some ossified determination of ‘nature’ is not only untenable but indeed counterproductive to the aims of those would otherwise advocate for it. As Biro writes, “a denaturalized ecological
politics might be facilitated by extending this distinction to the realm of human ecology, distinguishing between the relations with, and transformations of, nature that are necessary for human survival,
and those that serve only to reproduce relations of domination. Positing a distinction between forms
of asserting human separateness from the natural world – between those that are ‘basic’ to human
survival and flouring, and those that are ‘surplus,’ serving only to facilitate unnecessary aggression –
might thus be a first step towards a simultaneously progressive and ecological politics.”135
That is, it is not that chemical companies such as Monsanto and Dow, or water regulators like
eThekwini Water Services of Durban or Thames Water of the UK, are merely performing interventions or ‘meddling’ in a pre-existent and sacrosanct ‘nature,’ but rather that they are performing the
wrong interventions, ones informed solely by the edicts of neoliberal ideology and employed whether
their effects be beneficial to the commons as a whole or, as is far more often the case, detrimental.
As Laila Smith and Greg Ruiters write, “once water is commodified” the systems responsible for its
deployment lack “a political, social and administrative salience,”136 so it is incumbent upon us not
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only to resist such shortsighted and exclusionary political forms, but to resist such a retreat, and to
appropriate the means of production towards more inclusionary and beneficial aims. As Jane Bennett writes, “if I live not as a human subject who confronts natural and cultural objects but as one
of many conative actants swarming and competing with each other, then frugality is too simple a
maxim. Sometimes ecohealth will require individuals and collectives to back off or ramp down their
activeness, and sometimes it will call for grander, more dramatic and violent expenditures of human
energy.”137 That is, in and under a politic inherent to Unitary Urbanism, in which all things are both
accounted for in their capacities and needs, the relations between erstwhile considered humans and
nonhumans ought to be a well-considered give and take, with the abandonment or radical reconfiguration of techno-social assemblages which irreparably harm other members of the commons with
little diffuse and egalitarian benefit (Haliburton, Monsanto, Archers-Daniel Midland, the coal and natural gas industries, etc.), and the expansion and radical reconfiguration of techno-social assemblages
which promote the most amicable and commensal well-being of all of its constituent members.
This politics of Unitary Urbanism when conceived of as an edict to recomport ourselves to
the ontological standing of other members of the commons therefore aspires to the same altruistic ends of environmentalism and deep ecology but in fact surpasses them and transcends their
‘material and discursive limits of reform’ by being in and of itself revolutionary to even leftist political arrangements and environmental politics as a discipline unto itself, by standing in opposition to
the ontological presuppositions of almost all extant political forms, and certainly the ones practiced
within the delimited sphere of urban water distribution. As Bryant writes, “some see this as a horrible
hobbling of humans that would propose that we should prefer the bubonic plague to humans and
that we should prefer the appetite of lions to children. But that was never the point. The point is to
recognize how we are dependent for our agency and existence on broader networks of entities, that
we aren’t little gods legislating everything in our image, and that if we wish to do well we better attend to these things. The stakes are not to defend science over culture, but to reconceptualize the
very nature of ourselves, nature, our duties and obligations.”138 It is on this distinction on which rests
the practical difference between, on the one hand, the hydro-social projects inaugurated by specSwyngedouw (London: Routledge, 2006), 194.
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tacular neoliberal ideology – and the hydro social projects inaugurated by fascism (cf. Swyngedouw
on ‘The Scalar Politics of Franco’s Hydro-Social Dream’139) – and the hypothetical hydro-social
politics of Unitary Urbanism on the other. Both the totalizing and reductive politics of neoliberalism
and fascism have engage in – and the radically democratic politics of Unitary Urbanism would, in
form, engage in – at times, large scale interventions into the hydro-social cycle, in their composing
arrangements and in their maintenance of them, but whereas the former, neoliberalism and fascism,
have done so with purely the goods of the neoliberal subject or the monological ‘people’ of fascism,
and ultimately the neoliberal arbiters and fascist ‘great leader,’ in mind, the latter would do so with
the goods of all actors, assemblages, and their networked relations in mind. As Papadopolous asks,
“how can we populate this space, fill it with acts of justice before and independent of the law of the
state? I am not talking here of clichés such as taking justice in our hands, nor of blank apologies
of violence, but of possibilities for creating spaces of polite engagements and respect that are not
dominated by an anthropocentric humanistic view that continuously restores a new coercive form of
law after the other.”140
Indeed reorienting ourselves towards the ontological standing of ‘others’ is equally well a
reorientation towards the ontological standing of ourselves, insofar as – again – neoliberalism is by
nature treacherous, and the arbiters of spectacular global capital are far more likely to section off
populations and excommunicate them from their figuration within the neoliberal political assemblages
as ‘less than human’ to remain in keeping with their shallow cosmopolitan pretensions than they are
to progressively, and one should note profitlessly, amend the manifold mechanisms that produce
such disparity, most centrally its edict to first and foremost produce wealth. “The local waters of the
city constitute a sphere in which a commercialized state entity has attempted to ensure its profitability, through fencing in something formerly considered to reside outside of capital’s orbit,”141 as Alex
Loftus explains it – and indeed as Robert Kennedy, Jr. once so eloquently put it, “we are witnessing
something unprecedented: water no longer flows downhill – it flows towards money.”142 That is, it is
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not only in the interests of spectacular global capital to debase and marginalize the ontological standing of materials in everyday life, in addition to aesthetically obscuring them to maintain their debasement and marginalization, but it is in the interests of spectacular global capital to debase and marginalize those who cannot avail themselves of the only language that neoliberalism speaks, money. As
Swyngedouw writes, “true scarcity does not reside in the physical absence of water in most cases,
but in the lack of monetary resources and political and economic clout. Poverty and governance that
marginalizes makes people die of thirst, not absence of water.”143 In other words, in most instances
it is not some originary fault of ‘nature’ that deprives us, or other networked assemblages of actors,
with the requisite water, but rather the specific character of neoliberal ideology and the aesthetic
composition of spectacular global capital, and indeed the general perception that this is otherwise,
that a rote absence of water is what determines the parameters of water scarcity, is itself a spectacular aesthetic and political construct.
In a roundabout way, then, one must concede there to be a nonetheless ethical humanist
component of the politics inherent to the kind of commons commensurable with such alternative
ontological orientation, in spite of such a politics’ commitment to ‘the human’ being only one entity
amongst many that must be numbered amongst the commons (if it can even be deployed as a useful
functional category outside of its contemporary neoliberal articulation at all), in that such a commons
would stand in opposition to the commodification of water, not simply for the nonhuman assemblages that rely on that water to remain more or less unmolested by techno-social assemblages,
but moreover for the impoverished erstwhile considered ‘human’ populations that neoliberal political
forms would seek to divest themselves of. As Heynen, Kaika and Swyngedouw write, “this commodity relation veils and hides the multiple socio-ecological processes of domination/ subordination and
exploitation/repression that feed the capitalist urbanization process and turn the city into a metabolic
socio-environmental process that stretches from the immediate environment to the remotest corners
of the globe.”144 The dissolution of spectacular politics under conditions of revolution would then entail not only a liberation for uncounted nonhuman actors and the techno-social networks that develop
around them, but moreover for uncounted erstwhile considered human actors, in that the dissolution
of the ontological heirarchy between them would be equally well the dissolution of the divisionary
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politics of who does or does not merit the ‘human rights’ that would otherwise afford them access
to water, a division that under conditions of neoliberalism tends to see many erstwhile considered
‘humans,’ fall helplessly on the wrong side as ‘less than human’ or not subjects proper to neoliberal
ideology. Disastrous implementations of water privatization in Africa and South America – notably
Durban, South Africa and Cochabamba, Bolivia – should give us pause on making profitability the
terms under which different assemblages which functionally need water either do or do not merit their
being provided with water, but the ecological damage wrought by poorly conceived appropriations
of water by metropolitan spaces closer to home should equally well give us pause, also, on making
convenience and efficiency for the neoliberal subject the terms under which we judge the merit of
such appropriations. As Marc de Villiers writes:
Europeans are still using their rivers as convenient sewers, and there
is hardly a meter of European coastline without some level of pollution.
The worst is the Mediterranean coast from Barcelona around to the toe
of Italy, but there are many other areas almost as bad: from Venice to
Trieste, around the city of Athens, the Danube Delta, the Volga Delta,
the east coast of the Gulf of Bosnia, all of the Gulf of Finland, all of the
Gulf of Riga, the coast on the southern Baltic from Gdansk to the Sound
at Denmark, the whole area around Copenhagen, Goteborg, Oslo, the
mouth of the Elbe and all Friesland, the coast from Amsterdam to Le
Havre, the Thames Estuary and the Strait of Dover, the eastern British
Isles from the Wash to Edinburgh, and the Bristol Channel. Less polluted, but still causing concern, are the Aegean, the Dardanelles, the
eastern Black Sea, and parts of the Caspian. In 1998, of the 472 British
beaches designated by the European Union as bathing beaches, only
forty-five were found free of pollution, and the commissioner’s report
was full of horror stories – raw sewage lapping at the sands, children
gaily topping sand castles with used condoms, and swimmers catching gastrointestinal illnesses and, on a few occasions, viral hepatitis. . .
The Great Lakes are cleaner than they used to be – there is fishing in
Lake Erie again – but there are still reservoirs of agricultural and chemical runoff, and heavy metals in the health-hazardous concentrations.
Among the worst polluted places are Lake Michigan, southern Lake Huron, southern Georgian Bay, Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, the lower St. Lawrence River, the northern coast of Maine, the coast of Georgia to Boston, Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, and Los Angeles to Ensenada,
Mexico. . . Dozens of cities are still pouring raw sewage into waterways.
Sewage outfall pipes still dump stormwater mixed with sewage into New
York’s Hudson River. . . In China, 80 per cent of the country’s 50,000
kilometers of major rivers are so degraded they no longer support any
fish. Seventy per cent of China’s catch once came from the Yangt’ze,
but it has declined by more than half since the 1960s. The rapid industrialization has made the idea of pollution control moot. In the Yellow
River, discharge from paper mills, tanneries, oil-refineries, and chemical plants has poured into the water, which is now laced with heavy
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metals and other toxins that make it unfit even for irrigation. Traces of
lead, chromium, and cadmium have been found in vegetables sold in
city markets, and so have concentrations of arsenic. Farm chemicals
washing into the sea are being blamed for massive blooms of algae.
Shanghai recently spent some $300 million dollars moving its intake
of water further away from the city because nearby river water was too
polluted.145
So when Bryant writes, as was noted in the introduction, that Kant’s specific epistemology is less at
issue than is the Copernican spirit that it therefore inaugurated, this is at least one aspect of what
is meant by that transmutation, that the congealed ideological edifice of an epistemology premised
upon an ontological agnosticism towards other actors and networks than constitute everyday life –
and the architecture and politics that such an agnosticism gives rise to – inevitably creates the conditions under which a fundamental disrespect or lack of care for that existent world takes place. It’s not
simply that we ought to not be wantonly savaging the ecosystems – defined by Roy Rappaport as
“the total of ecological populations and nonliving substances bound together in material exchanges in
a demarcated portion of the biosphere”146 – that we live within and partially constitute, but rather that
in the absence of understanding our place and station within such ecosystems we have no means
with which to reorient our specific projects and actions. As Bryant writes:
Once we include nonhumans in our social and political thought we both
arrive at more nuanced understandings of why social assemblages
are as they are (cartography), but also broaden our means of political
intervention. . . recognizing that people might be entangled in ‘sticky
material networks’ or regimes of attraction gives us the opportunity to
set about undoing these networks (deconstruction) and providing other
material alternatives (composition).”147
The techno-social assemblages of the contemporary western metropolis, especially in its ‘liberal
democratic’ incarnation, therefore represents a kind of Aristotelian political model, which operates
as a pseudo-democracy, that is – like Aristotelian democracy – it is ‘democratic’ for only those who
have been implicitly prefigured as democratic actors, but undemocratic for those who have been
implicitly prefigured as materials and mechanisms in the service of those actors, i.e. “that some
should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient. . . Such a duality exists
in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in things
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which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode”148 (and hence Aristotle excluded
from participation in democracy not only mariners, the young, and, most notably, women, but moreover inaugurated the democratically sanctioned subservience of an objectified nature to the subject
of his delimited pseudo-democracy that survives in the form of liberal democracy today). In other
words, in the case of the contemporary liberal democracy, the exclusion of actors is premised upon a
universalizing objectification of ‘nature’ in such a way as to obscure its having been socially produced
as such – that is, ‘liberal democracy,’ like Aristotle’s ‘democracy,’ produces its own margins but produces them in such a way as to appear otherwise both inclusive and originary, and thus represents
merely the spectacular image of democracy. Again, as Kaika writes:
The dialectic of the environment and urbanization consolidates a particular set of social relations through ‘an ecological transformation which
requires the reproduction of those relations in order to sustain it.’ The
commodity relation veils and hides the multiple socio-ecological processes of domination/subordination and exploitation/repression that
feed the capitalist urbanization process and turn the city into a polymorphous metabolic socio-environmental process that stretches from the
immediate environment to the remotest corners of the globe. Indeed,
the apparently self-evident commodification of nature that fundamentally underpins a market-based society not only obscures the social
relations of power inscribed therein, but also permits the disconnection
of the perpetual flows of transformed and commodified nature from its
inevitable foundation, i.e., the transformation of nature.149
Or rather, the ideological constitution of our relation to the rest of the cosmological whole as a totalized and objectified ‘nature,’ of which we in these terms do not constitute a part, becomes congealed
in the reproduction of those relations as epistemology – not Kant’s conception of epistemology, per
se, but one which similarly maintains its ‘spirit of Copernicanism,’ i.e. a steadfast disregard for the
question of das ding an sich, the thing in itself, of entities like water and associated entities in the
reproduction of neoliberal politics.
The ontological binary that the neoliberalism both produces and assumes to fuel its continued
promulgation and proliferation does not therefore represent an actual ontological arrangement (or
even propose one, as was Kant’s otherwise altruistic intent) but merely represents the most amenable spectacular image of an ontology to the most virulent flows and functions of global capital.
The division and constitution of neoliberal subject from a sequestered and objectified nature allows
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for an ostensible dumping ground of things that are either inconvenient for neoliberalism to address
or irreconcilable to neoliberalism’s cosmopolitan pretensions. Again, As Paul-Henry Chombart de
Lauwe writes, “it is precisely in order to grasp these levels of social reality, especially practices and
behaviours, that we must define a simultaneously ecological and cultural space, without effecting a
dissociation between the two orders of phenomena.”150 It is only by seeing past this ossified spectacular image of our relative ontological standing that we can hope to develop practices of judging
‘good’ actors and networks in the commons from ‘bad,’ and this reorientation is inherently revolutionary because the only such judgements we can make from within the discursive limits of a politics that
implicitly denies such ontological respect to other actors and networks is that this is simply wrong
– not morally but philosophically, as Bryant points out – and that what supersedes it will be not only
different but indeed premised upon the respect of difference itself. That is, as Bryant writes:
One way of distinguishing the revolutionary from the reactionary is that
the latter always argues that there is 1) a necessary order to the social world to the social world and that therefore 2) the social world can
be organized in no other way. In other words, the reactionary always
argues that the social world is either naturally or divinely decreed. By
contrast, the revolutionary always argues that the social world is contingent or that things are capable of being otherwise. . .”151
To be sure, a commons which respects the ontological continuum of actors and networks, each accounted for as a member of the democratic and cosmological whole, would entail a politics, though
not merely a politics, of contingency. An indeed the understanding of such arrangements would
themselves need to be itself democratically available, and therefore “the complicity of science and
capitalism [which] provides capitalism with a speculative weapon capable of imposing capitalism as
the universal horizon of politico-economic problems”152 would need to be itself overturned. As the
authors of the Situationist International write:
The raw facts, known by all specialists, repudiate the current organization of reality. . . making an implacable and immediate critique of it.
Hired specialists have for too long congratulated themselves on the fact
that nobody represents these truths that all of reality proffers. How they
tremble! Their good times are over. We will knock them down, along
with all the hierarchies they shelter.153
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This is the basis of a politics inherent to Unitary Urbanism, the complete refashioning of the urban
sphere so as to be distinct and separate from all that which is distinct and separate, including politics.
That is, Unitary Urbanism is in this respect distinct from not only an architecture that is merely architectural and a politics that is merely political, but distinct moreover from an ontology which is merely
ontological, when it does not speak to and progressively and equitably codetermine the arrangement
of the ecological whole in its entirety. Again, the spectacle of the metropolis today brings all things
together but brings them together as nonetheless separate, and this must be evacuated through the
development of not only a thoroughgoing ontological reorientation to the materials which constitute
everyday life (ourselves amongst them), but moreover the development of otherwise political arrangements premised on contingency, which continuously evaluate and adapt to the evolutions and
transmutations of the actors and networks who comprise its commons.
This is why an understanding of the role that water and its concomitant networks and assemblages play in the constitution of the urban environment, and the ways that they have been
included within the spectacle but included as nonetheless politically and aesthetically excluded from
the spectacle’s most salient expression in everyday life, the visual constitution of the city, is necessary for the development of alternative holistic arrangements. Water can be understood, then, as one
vanguard of a kind of ontological insurgency. “There is a great story to be told about the unmapped
and untraceable water supply and sewerage networks that dwell underneath the city, hidden most
of the time, but revealing their existence in unpredictable ways and moments (recently in the form of
problematic water quality in some areas, high leakage rates, bursting pipes, internationalization of
water companies, and ‘fat cat’ water company directors),”154 as Kaika writes, “a leakage or burst pipe
reveals a hidden and intricate system of pipes and water mains; a dry tap due to water shortages or
maintenance works refers to the complex network of production and distribution of water.”155 Water
networks are therefore sites of ontological contestation, where non-human assemblages are supressed – literally buried in the urban assemblage – and yet frequently reveal themselves and insist
upon their ontological account, that is, insist upon their registration in the political whole in spite of
their visual exclusion or shallow fetishized inclusion (the “architectonic prostitution” of public fountains
for example). As Deleuze writes of so-called ‘smooth’ space:
. . .desert, sky, or sea, the Ocean, the Unlimited, first plays the role of
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an encompassing element, and tends to become a horizon: the earth
is thus surrounded, globalized, ‘grounded’ by this element, which holds
it in immobile equilibrium and makes Form possible. Then to the extent
that the encompassing element itself appears at the center of the earth,
it assumes a second role, that of casting into the loathesome deep, the
abode of the dead, anything smooth or nonmeasured that may have
remained.156
In other words, while dependent upon its appropriation, contemporary political forms which obtain
within the western urban landscape require a constantly manufactured quietude surrounding the
ontological station of water and its networks and assemblages in order to maintain itself. As Kaika
writes, such insurgencies “remain stubborn reminders of the materiality of the networked city and
undermine its smooth façade.”157 As Bryant writes, “recognizing that people might be entangled in
‘sticky material networks’ or regimes of attraction gives us the opportunity to set about undoing these
networks (deconstruction) and providing other material alternatives (composition).”158 In addition to
their mutual insistence that the technologies of separation that operate under the flag of spectacular
global capital be dismantled, then, this too is a site of essential agreement between the situationist
articulation of a Unitary Urbanism and the nascent political implications of new materialism, speculative realism, onticology, object oriented ontology and the like: that the means by which this dismantling and recomposition will take place will be an insurgent and iconoclastic celebration of both collective endeavour and the possibilities opened up by the radically democratic inclusion of all things
within the cosmological whole. As Latour writes:
Actors are defined above all as obstacles, scandals, as what suspends
mastery, as what gets in the way of domination, as what interrupts the
closure and the composition of the collective. To put it crudely, human
and nonhuman actors appear first of all as troublemakers. The notion
of recalcitrance offers the most appropriate approach to defining their
action.159
That is, when given purchase by an ontological comportment which recognizes them as such, as
Bennett writes, “the demos more or less spontaneously constructs ‘a polemical scene’ within which
what was formerly heard as noise by powerful persons begins to sound to them like ‘argumentative utterances.’”160 To be sure, at the height of his own preposterous self-parody during the 2008
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US presidential campaign, John McCain implored the otherwise favourable crowd to which he was
speaking to ignore a protesting Iraq war vetran; to ‘not be diverted by the ground noise and static,’ as
he phrased it. Such instances represent the butting heads of assemblages with a neoliberal politics
that neither has interest in representing them nor the capacity to account for their various semantic
or non-semantic interjections. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to develop more inclusive political
forms that can, ones which not only do not ignore ‘the ground noise and static’ but explicitly seek
to make the many competing demands of various networks and assemblages interpretable to one
another and produce arrangements which respect each in their own particular mode.
The means by which the reigning neoliberal mode of spectacular society produces the particular mode of its ontological privileging, codified in the terms of its political arrangement and reified into delimited architectural forms, is not only represented and reflected in the organization of its
constituent actors and networks as instrumentally ‘for us,’ but moreover deployed as itself a means
of sustaining such privilege. As Loftus and Lumsden write, “the hydraulic architecture of a state is always bound up in choreographies of power and in the reproduction of specific ideologies.”161 In other
words, in the aesthetic and political inclusion of water and its concomitant networks and assemblages ‘as excluded’ from aesthetic and political participation within the composition of the urban whole
– their ontological objectification, banalization and visual exclusion – the techno-social assemblage
of spectacular global capital, under the functional rubric of neoliberal ideology, crafts and contours
such inclusion-as-exclusion in such a manner as to carry out the work of such ontological objectification – banalization and visual exclusion itself – reproducing the conditions under which such actors, networks and assemblages will inevitably fail to grasp the contours of their own subservience.
“A revolutionary organization must constitute an integral critique of society, that is, it must make a
comprehensive critique of all aspects of alienated social life while refusing to compromise with any
form of separate power anywhere in the world,”162 as Debord writes, “and they cannot set themselves
any lesser task if they wish to be recognised and to recognize themselves in a world of their own
making.”163 Subjecting spectacular political forms like neoliberalism – which depend upon the ontological debasement of actors in the contemporary urban sphere like water and its assemblages – to
radically democratic critique cognisant of such ontological stakes is therefore, as Bryant notes, “not

161 Alex Loftus and Fiona Lumden, “Reworking Hegemony in the Urban Waterscape” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 33 No. 1 (2008), 110.
162 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 70.
163 Ibid, 99.
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to reject the methodologies of the humanists and their concerns (laws, norms, beliefs, ideology, signifiers, contracts, etc.) but to broaden the field of political engagement, intervention, and analysis,”164
and to look to, as Loftus and Lumsden write, “the ways in which the struggle over ideas in the everyday production of the waterscape might open up new democratic possibilities.”165 Neoliberalism
and spectacular global capital represent the most virulent form of ontological debasement because
they tirelessly produce aesthetic arrangements in such a manner as to make them seem nonetheless not-produced, as though there were something ‘natural’ about the relations of domination that
they give rise to. It is not that neoliberalism simply takes advantage of the ontological agnosticism of
the Copernican spirit, but moreso that it actively produces it, ideologically congealing it to the general
epistemic horizon of what is or is not possible.
Unitary Urbanism – when cast as a rejection of spectacular separation in the practice of
everyday life in the city and the ontological debasement of others that such spectacular separation
both represents and produces – would therefore have neither delimited politics nor delineable politicians, but rather civic participation by various beings in various asymmetrical ways, and would entail
a multiplication of possibilities for the ways in which these beings might participate together. A hydrosocial assemblage of Unitary Urbanism may very well be less ‘efficient’ by the standards set forth by
neoliberal political and the aesthetic forms of spectacular global capital for their own measure – as
“the present debate over water resources often sacrifices democratic governance on the altar of
technological or economic efficiency, while safeguarding existing power relations”166 – but it would
be nonetheless more amenable to and able to employ novel, provisional, contingent arrangements
which would base hydro-social intervention on the needs of the holistically conceived commons rather than the needs of spectacular global capital itself towards the ends of its own hollow reproduction.
In the same way that Unitary Urbanism would supplant the hermetic discipline of architecture in the
construction of otherwise architectural forms – insofar as they would be simultaneously poetic forms,
mathematical forms, cultural forms, logistical forms, technological forms, among others, conceived
of simultaneously, in concert with the construction of all other forms of such a commons in the urban
environmental whole – Unitary Urbanism supplants the hermetic discipline of politics in the construction of otherwise political forms for precisely the same reason. The hydro-social composition of
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distributional arrangements of a Unitary Urbanism would be political, as they would be architectural,
but only in virtue of its having evacuated these disciplines in their autonomous and isolated forms.
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Conclusion
The Real and the False of the Total
The concept of totality has as many disadvantages as it has
advantages. Without it, theoretical thought would be impossible.
With it, theoretical thought risks losing itself in dogmatism. The
idea of totality (or even totalisation) brings with it certain imperatives. Once put into place, it is in command. It demands all
thought, all knowledge, all action. It directs knowledge; it orients
investigations and plans them. It tends towards immanent structure. It desires power. How can we conceive of totality if we do
not share its point of view?
– Henri Lefebvre

The stars are indifferent to astronomy
And all that we think we know
Mars will salute your autonomy
But he doesn’t need to know
– Matthew Caws

In the past three chapters it has been proposed that the way urban water distribution networks are
constituted is neither neutral nor arbitrary, but rather very much intentional and produce, and are
produced in turn, by a neoliberal ideology and a technology of separation called ‘the spectacle.’ The
spectacle adapts itself to the conditions of history, which falls under the rubric of the spectacle itself,
and hence the most recent manifestation of the spectacle has been global capital and neoliberal
ideology, for which history ‘ended.’ Spectacular global capital – the holistic and hegemonic image
broadcast over everyday life by neoliberal ideology – deploys two things in its own endless reproduction: first, it deploys a spectacular disciplinarity, sectioning the studies of the urban into hermetic endeavors – endeavors which by their constitution cannot speak to one another productively about their
object of study, the urban – allowing the spectacle to subsist in and totalize from the liminal space
at the margin of one discipline’s meeting another; and second, by marshalling these spectacularly
sectioned disciplines into the construction of forms of organization and built environments that are
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amenable to the spectacle’s own endless reinscription, primarily politics and architecture. It has been
suggested that politics and architecture are typical of the spectacular disciplinarity that pervades
neoliberal ideology, and inhibit us from a unified study and rearticulation of the urban commons, and
inhibits us, moreover, from an appreciation of the ontological resonances that such a unified praxis of
composition would imply. It is indeed within the interests of specific neoliberal states, as the servants
of spectacular global capital, to operate under the presupposition of materials like water being merely
‘the playthings of a kind of diffuse human solipsism’ (Chapter two).
In asking the question of an ontological urbanism we have seen how the aesthetic banishment of hydro-technical assemblages is not simply the result of a loss of faith in the promise of
modernity, as it is for Maria Kaika, but rather a tool in the service of an ideology towards its own continuation. Ideology supplants the possibility of an engagement with the real with its own discursive
irreality and both constructs the urban environment to suit, and constructs the constructors of the
urban environment to suit (architects, politicians, etc.) by inaugurating a spectacular disciplinarity that
is proper to the spectacle’s propensity for separation. In structuring water as a hermetic commodity in
such a way as to seem, itself, part of the built environment, neoliberal ideology veils water’s connection with the broader ecological commons, and veils the virulent consequences of this structuration to
that broader ecological commons. This structuration operates in and through the two of the primary
modes of spectacular disciplinarity, politics and architecture, wherein architecture serves to institute
and maintain the illusion of a pure break between inside and outside, and politics serves to codify
and preserve its own dualisms of inside and outside – that is, to be inside or outside the count; to be
inside or outside the purview of a care or solicitude; to be inside or outside of a ‘democratic’ inclusion
that, by its origins, really ought to have no outside.
The spectacle is a system of totalisation that brings all things together but brings them together as nonetheless separate, and therefore mollified and benign. To this spectacle, then, what has
been proposed is an alternative system of totalisation, but one that brings the denizens of the urban
commons together as fundamentally present to one another. Lefebvre is quoted above cautioning
that totality is not self-same with ‘our’ concerns, and this can be intimidating, but it is indeed no more
intimidating than realising that the concerns of a broader unit are not self-same with the concerns of
its constituent smaller unit, like any two social membranes meeting and mixing, and that relating fairly
and ethically demands that we not be dissuaded by the selfish ontological privileging of the human
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inherent to neoliberal ideology. Indeed this rejection is what totalisation ought to imply when deployed
as a revolutionary concept, as a totalisation that silences cannot, by definition, really totalize. As
McKenzie Wark notes:
MW: To what extent can particular actions and the conceptual armatures they create nevertheless touch the question of the totality? It
strikes me as a really relevant question to put back on the agenda. And
totality was kind of the forbidden concept when I was coming up, as
they say, ‘you aren’t allowed to talk about that! It’s evil and Stalinist!’
and metaphysical, and of those the last claim is, in a sense, the accurate one. . .
DC: And in some circles the most damning. . .
MW: Yeah, but on the other hand, in the twenty-first century you can
retranslate totality as biosphere – as an open system that we actually inhabit with more or less measurable parameters, and that to me
is what totality now means. And Debord in the late work is tentatively
grasping – you know, there isn’t a language for it, no one quite knows
what or how one is increasingly bumping up against totality as a real
material presence.167

Political Ecology is the language of illumination of such a totality, revealing how the urban landscape
is composed and how it has been instrumentally obscured by neoliberal ideology, and indeed revealing how we are ourselves mired and implicated in its spectacular separations. Unitary Urbanism is the
program of compositional gestures and acts that would compose a city premised upon this alternative
totality; upon an ontological respect and inclusion for all delineable actors, networks and assemblages. Indeed the program is simple, recognize the ontological autonomy of each constituent aspect of
the ecological, and indeed cosmological, whole, and then determine the function of the commons that
results together, new and old members of the collective alike, without privileging some members over
others (as in the case of the liberal humanism that often accompanies neoliberal ideology). As Nancy
writes, “it has to be an ontology for each and everyone and for the world ‘as a totality,’ and nothing
short of the whole world, since this is all there is (but, in this way, there is all).”168 In other words, Political Ecology provides the topology of inclusion and exclusion that obtains within the contemporary
urban ecological whole, and Unitary Urbanism provides the corrective to this in the form of holistic
compositional acts aimed at the redress of such exclusions. In the case of water distribution networks,

167 Wark quoted in Dock Currie “Situationist Materialism: Beach Beneath the Street, an Interview with McKenzie Wark”
in Theory & Criticism Prosthesis (forthcoming).
168 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 53 – 54.
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then, this would on the one hand mean freeing them from the kind of fetishization that Maria Kaika
says characterizes their aesthetic and visual salience (or lack thereof), and on the other hand it would
mean allowing those networks, the relevant assemblages, and water itself to contribute to the composition of the urban commons in a manner not dependent upon such fetishization.
This work has made the case that such radical inclusion, and the compositional acts that such
radical inclusion entails, is not predicated upon a merely humanist ethics, but is predicated on an ethics which recognizes the spuriousness inherent to determinations of ‘the human,’ and hence seeks to
be an ethics for all – akin, therefore, to the ontology upon which it would by necessity be premised,
that is, an ontology for all. In the absence of firm delimitation between human / non-human, subject /
object, man / nature, we have only recourse to the ethical purview of an ecological commons without
such striation and segmentation. The aim, therefore, is to recognize that our fates are profoundly
imbricated with the fates of material networks and assemblages like those surrounding water, and
to compose a commons capable of addressing the consequences of such imbrication. Such a commons cannot be built on the back of a spectacular disciplinarity, such a commons can only be conceived of and realized by the recognition of all modes of relation as equally valid and equally able to
speak to its composition. In bringing together situationist praxis and Speculative Materialist ontology
it is hoped that we might break down the breaks between poetry and politics, between art and architecture, and build cities that reflect their being utilized together in the reified edifices of everyday life.
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